Distributed temporal logic for the analysis of security protocol models  by Basin, David et al.
Theoretical Computer Science 412 (2011) 4007–4043
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Theoretical Computer Science
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/tcs
Distributed temporal logic for the analysis of security protocol models
David Basin a, Carlos Caleiro b, Jaime Ramos b, Luca Viganò c,∗
a Department of Computer Science, ETH Zurich, Switzerland
b SQIG - Instituto de Telecomunicações and Department of Mathematics, IST, TU Lisbon, Portugal
c Department of Computer Science, University of Verona, Italy
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 18 April 2010
Received in revised form 22 March 2011
Accepted 3 April 2011
Communicated by R. Gorrieri
Keywords:
Security protocols
Security protocol analysis
Security protocol models
Temporal logic
Distributed temporal logic
a b s t r a c t
The distributed temporal logic DTL is an expressive logic, well suited for formalizing
properties of concurrent, communicating agents. We show how DTL can be used as a
metalogic to reason about and relate different security protocol models. This includes
reasoning aboutmodel simplifications,wheremodels are transformed to have fewer agents
or behaviors, and verifying model reductions, where to establish the validity of a property
it suffices to consider its satisfaction on only a subset of models.
We illustrate how DTL can be used to formalize security models, protocols, and
properties, and then present three concrete examples of metareasoning. First, we
prove a general theorem about sufficient conditions for data to remain secret during
communication. Second, we prove the equivalence of two models for guaranteeing
message-origin authentication. Finally, we relate channel-based and intruder-centric
models, showing that it is sufficient to consider models in which the intruder completely
controls the network. While some of these results belong to the folklore or have been
shown, mutatis mutandis, using other formalisms, DTL provides a uniformmeans to prove
them within the same formalism. It also allows us to clarify subtle aspects of these model
transformations that are often neglected or cannot be specified in the first place.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Security protocols are distributed programs that employ cryptography in order to achieve their objectives in possibly
hostile environments. They have been widely studied within the formal methods community as they are difficult to design
and notoriously prone to error; it is difficult to predict all the possible ways that distributed computation may proceed and
thereby foresee all the ways that an intruder can overcome cryptography by exploiting the willingness of honest agents to
communicate. The research in this area is extensive and a number of logics and formalisms exist for specifying and verifying
security protocols.
Our contribution in this paper is not anothermethod or tool for protocol analysis. Rather, we present a logical foundation
for formalizing and reasoning about models of security protocols, which are at the heart of other methods and tools. The
foundation is based on DTL, a distributed temporal logic [34]. DTL is an expressive, general-purpose logic that is well suited
for formalizing both local, agent-specific properties and global properties of distributed communicating processes. Within
DTL, we formalize different theories for security protocol analysis, capturing different ways that agents can interact with the
network in the presence of an active intruder.Weuse these theories to showhowDTL can be used in two, quite distinctways:
• as an object logic for formalizing specific protocol models and proving properties of protocols with respect to these
models, and
• as ametalogic for relating different models and proving metatheorems about the models themselves.
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To show how DTL can be used as an object logic, we consider the well-known NSPK protocol [54] and its corrected
version NSL [42]. We use these to illustrate DTL’s application to both protocol falsification and verification. As mentioned
above, there are many existing formalisms for reasoning about protocols. However, unlike existing formalisms for object-
level protocol analysis, DTL is additionally suitable as a metalogic, and the possibility of using DTL effectively as an object
logic is a necessary prerequisite for more advanced metalogical applications. Conversely, an effective metalogic aids object
logic applications in that we can derive general metatheorems useful for protocol verification. We will illustrate this by
establishing a general result about sufficient conditions for data to remain secret during communication.
To further show how DTL can be used as a metalogic, we present applications to formalizing and verifying properties
of security protocol models and translations between models. Our motivations here are both theoretical and practical.
Within the security community, a wide variety of different models have been proposed, often with slightly differing
assumptions, concerning communication, the powers of the intruder, and the abstractions used in describing security
protocols. Theoretically, we would like to understand, and have a formal foundation for establishing, the relationship
between these different models. Practically, when building security protocol analysis tools, we would like to reduce the
number of different scenarios that must be searched (model reduction) as well as to simplify the scenarios considered (model
simplification). Such optimizations can substantially improve the efficiency of algorithmic verification tools and should be
employed whenever possible, provided they preserve the properties of interest. The challenge, of course, is to formalize and
prove this. Our contribution is to show how DTL can be used to give a simple, rigorous, and uniform account of different
model reduction and simplification techniques aswell as other kinds ofmetatheoretic properties of security protocolmodels.
We do this by studying concrete models, showing how they can be formalized naturally and reasoned about using DTL.
First, we formalize and prove the equivalence of two models for guaranteeing message-origin authentication. The first
model is an abstract model where principals may use a special channel, controlled by a trusted third party, that logs all
incoming messages and issues evidence of their origin to the recipients. The second model is more concrete and uses
digital signatures to implement an authentic channel. We present two different transformations of the corresponding DTL
models and corresponding notions of equivalence based on preserving translations of properties. This example is not aimed
at justifying a model simplification, but rather at showing how DTL can be used to relate models at different levels of
abstraction. The equivalences we prove can be used to justify that concrete (signature-based) designs achieve the more
abstract notion of message-origin authentication defined in terms of a trusted third party.
Afterward, we use DTL as a metalogic to explore the exact meaning of different modeling assumptions that are common
in security protocol analysis. Namely, even when working with an intruder who controls the network, one must make
numerous modeling decisions. For example, is the intruder identified with the network? That is, does he coexist with the
network and intercept messages sent to the network versus is he identified with the network and all messages are sent
directly to him? Alternatively, does one consider all possible interleavings between intruder actions and those of honest
agents or only some subset? In particular, under suitable assumptions, we establish the following results:
(1) the intruder can be identified with the network;
(2) the steps (actions) of honest agents can be ‘‘compressed’’ in the sense that the receipt of a message can always be
immediately followed by the agent sending a response; and
(3) all distribution in the model can be eliminated by considering all actions from the intruder’s point of view.
The results (1) and (3) constitute model simplifications as they involve a translation between models (and also properties),
leading to models that are simpler in the sense that they involve fewer agents or collapse behaviors. Result (2) exemplifies
a model reduction, where to establish the validity of a property it suffices to consider its satisfaction on only a subset of
models, namely just those models where steps are compressed.
While some of the results we prove belong to the folklore or have, mutatis mutandis, already been shown using other
formalisms, our logic provides a means to prove them in a general, uniform way within the same formalism. It also allows
us to clarify aspects of these properties that are often neglected or cannot be specified in the first place. For example, the
equivalences proved in the message-origin example depend critically on the capabilities of the intruder using the trusted
channel, what exactly is signed, and that different keys are used for different purposes.
While other logics or formalisms could beused for these tasks,webelieve thatDTL offers a number of advantages. Security
protocols are carried out by distributed agents, with individual state, who concurrently execute protocols, synchronizing
over shared communication. DTL provides a rich languagewith a corresponding semantics that naturally captures all of these
aspects. It has a distributed dimension that captures the agents, their local state, and communication. Concurrent execution,
aswell as the formalization of security properties, is captured by adding a temporal dimension based on past and future time
linear temporal operators. The logic is quite flexible and avoids commitment to particular models and properties, which are
formalized as DTL theories. The semantics of DTL is based on interpretation structures, which are a model of concurrent,
distributed systems that is well suited for carrying out semantic reasoning about, and transformation of, such systems.
A strength of our DTL formalization is that it allows us to spell out all the fine details of the security proofs that we give in
this paper. As is well known, this is particularly important in the area of Information Security, where researchers often have
well-developed intuitions, but their models and proofs are prone to subtle errors. Although we have developed a tableau
system for DTL [7,8], our proofs in this paper are semantic. We prefer semantic arguments because they are shorter and far
more intuitive than tableau proofs. In contrast, proofs with the tableau system can be machine checked. We note, in this
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regard, that the validity of DTL formulas can be decided by using a trace-consistent translation to LTL [8], which also makes
DTL amenable to model checking.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the distributed temporal logic DTL. In Section 3, we define in DTL a
protocol-independent distributed communicationmodel, on top ofwhich protocols and security goals can be formalized and
analyzed, as shown in Section 3.3. In Section 4 we illustrate how DTL can be used as an object logic to either verify security
protocols or construct counter-examples to their claimed properties. However, the results are established as a corollary of
a meta-level result about secrecy that we state and prove. The core results of the paper are in Section 5, where we present
the meta-level results, mentioned above. We draw conclusions and discuss related and future work in Section 6.
2. Distributed temporal logic
The distributed temporal logic DTL is a logic for reasoning about temporal properties of distributed systems from the
local point of view of the system’s agents, which are assumed to execute sequentially and to interact by synchronous event
sharing. In this paper, we use DTL theories given, in latu sensu, by classes of models satisfying axioms and other defining
conditions. Note that the set of axioms may be infinite, resulting in validity being undecidable in the theory, despite the
decidability result mentioned above. This is the case for the theories that we later present.
2.1. Syntax
The logic is defined over a distributed signature
Σ = ⟨Id, {Act i}i∈Id, {Propi}i∈Id⟩,
where Id is a finite set of agent identifiers and, for each i ∈ Id, Act i is a set of local action symbols and Propi is a set of local state
propositions. In a nutshell, the actions Act i correspond to true statements about an agent when they have just occurred and
the state propositions Propi characterize the current local states of the agents. Following standard protocol terminology, we
will also refer to the agents participating in a protocol execution as principals.
The global languageL is defined by the grammar
L ::= @i1 [Li1 ] | · · · | @in [Lin ] | ⊥ | L⇒L,
for Id = {i1, . . . , in}, where the local languagesLi for each i ∈ Id are defined by
Li ::= Act i | Propi | ⊥ | Li ⇒Li | Li ULi | Li SLi | c⃝j[Lj],
with j ∈ Id. As notation, we will use γ and δ for global formulas, and ϕ and ψ for local formulas.
A global formula @i[ϕ]means that the local formula ϕ holds for agent i. Local formulas, as the name suggests, hold locally
for the different agents. For instance, locally for an agent i, the operators U and S are the usual (strong) until and since
temporal operators, while the communication formula c⃝j[ψ] means that agent i has just communicated (synchronized)
with agent j, for whom ψ held.1
As notation, we write L̸ c⃝i to denote the set of all purely temporal formulas of Li, that is, excluding communication
formulas. We call ϕ ∈ L̸ c⃝i a private formula. Furthermore, if ϕ does not contain the temporal operators U and S, then we
call it a state formula. Finally, we writeL̸ c⃝ to denote the set of all global formulas built from private formulas.
Other logical connectives (conjunction, disjunction, etc.) and temporal operators can be defined as abbreviations, for
example:
Xϕ ≡ ⊥ U ϕ tomorrow (next)
Fϕ ≡ ⊤ U ϕ sometime in the future
F◦ ϕ ≡ ϕ ∨ Fϕ now or sometime in the future
Gϕ ≡ ¬ F¬ϕ always in the future
G◦ ϕ ≡ ϕ ∧ Gϕ now and always in the future
ϕ W ψ ≡ (Gϕ) ∨ (ϕ U ψ) weak until (unless)
Yϕ ≡ ⊥ S ϕ yesterday (previous)
Pϕ ≡ ⊤ S ϕ sometime in the past
P◦ ϕ ≡ ϕ ∨ Pϕ now or sometime in the past
Hϕ ≡ ¬ P¬ϕ always in the past
H◦ ϕ ≡ ϕ ∧ Hϕ now and always in the past
ϕ B ψ ≡ (Hϕ) ∨ (ϕ S ψ) weak since (back to)
∗ ≡ H⊥ in the beginning
ϕ ≫j ψ ≡ ϕ⇒ c⃝j[ψ] calling
Herewe use the subscript ◦ to denote the reflexive versions of operators. Note also that calling is specific to DTL as it involves
communication: @i[ϕ ≫j ψ]means that if ϕ holds for agent i then he calls (synchronizes with) agent j, for whom ψ must
hold.
1 Note that the DTL syntax here differs slightly from the original presentation in [34]. Previously, the operator c⃝i was overloaded with @i and its
interpretation was therefore context dependent.
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Fig. 1. A distributed life-cycle for agents A, B, and C .
Fig. 2. The progress of agent A.
2.2. Semantics
The protocol models that we consider are based on partially ordered sets of events with labeling information.We employ
sequences (of events or labels) to represent protocol executions and we write w = ⟨w1.w2.w3 . . . ⟩ to denote a possibly
infinite sequence whose elements are w1, w2, w3, . . . . Furthermore, we write |w| to denote the length of the sequence w,
where |⟨⟩| = 0 for the empty sequence ⟨⟩ and |w| = ∞ whenever w is infinite. Finally, we write w  w′ to denote the
concatenation of two sequences, provided that the first sequence is finite, and we write w|i to denote the prefix of w of
length i, i.e.w|i = ⟨w1 . . . wi⟩, provided that 0 ≤ i ≤ |w|. Clearly,w|0 = ⟨⟩.
The interpretation structures of L are labeled distributed life-cycles, built upon a simplified form of Winskel’s event
structures [66] (see also [67] for the relationship to other concurrency models). A local life-cycle of an agent i ∈ Id is a
countable (finite or infinite), discrete, and well-founded total order λi = ⟨Evi,≤i⟩, where Evi is the set of local events and≤i
the local order of causality. We define the corresponding local successor relation→i ⊆ Evi × Evi to be the relation such that
e →i e′ if e <i e′ and there is no e′′ such that e <i e′′ <i e′. As a consequence, ≤i=→∗i , i.e., ≤i is the reflexive, transitive
closure of→i.
A distributed life-cycle is a family λ = {λi}i∈Id of local life-cycles such that≤= (i∈Id ≤i)∗ defines a partial order of global
causality on the set of all events Ev = i∈Id Evi. Note that communication is modeled by event sharing, and thus for some
event e we may have e ∈ Evi ∩ Evj, with i ≠ j. In that case, requiring ≤ to be a partial order amounts to requiring that the
local orders are globally compatible, thus excluding the existence of another e′ ∈ Evi ∩ Evj such that e <i e′ but e′ <j e.
We can check the progress of an agent by collecting all the local events that have occurred up to a given point. This yields
the notion of the local state of agent i, which is a finite set ξi ⊆ Evi down-closed for local causality, i.e., if e ≤i e′ and e′ ∈ ξi
then also e ∈ ξi. The setΞi of all local states of an agent i is totally ordered by inclusion and has ∅ as the minimal element.
In general, each non-empty local state ξi is reached, by the occurrence of an event that we call last(ξi), from the local
state ξi \ {last(ξi)}.2 The local states of each agent are totally ordered, as a consequence of the total order on local events.
Since they are discrete andwell-founded, we can enumerate them as follows: ∅ is the 0th state; {e}, where e is theminimum
of ⟨Evi,≤i⟩, is the 1st state; and if ξi is the kth state of agent i and last(ξi)→i e, then ξi ∪ {e} is agent i’s (k+ 1)th state. We
will denote by ξ ki the kth state of agent i, so ξ
0
i = ∅ is the initial state and ξ ki is the state reached from the initial state after
the occurrence of the first k events. In fact, ξ ki is the only state of agent i that contains k elements, i.e., where |ξ ki | = k. Given
e ∈ Evi, (e↓ i) = {e′ ∈ Evi | e′ ≤i e} is always a local state. Moreover, if ξi is non-empty, then (last(ξi)↓ i) = ξi. Furthermore,
for every local state ξi ≠ Evi there exists a unique next event next(ξi), corresponding to the minimum event in Evi \ ξi, such
that ξi ∪ {next(ξi)} is a local state.
We can also define the notion of a global state: a finite set ξ ⊆ Ev closed for global causality, i.e. if e ≤ e′ and e′ ∈ ξ , then
also e ∈ ξ . The setΞ of all global states constitutes a lattice under inclusion and has ∅ as theminimal element. Clearly, every
global state ξ includes the local state ξ |i = ξ ∩ Evi of each agent i. Note that we are overloading the notation ·|i, which we
previously used to denote sequence prefixing, and below we will often write ξi for ξ |i. Given e ∈ Ev, e↓= {e′ ∈ Ev | e′ ≤ e}
is always a global state.
An interpretation structure µ = ⟨λ, α, π⟩ consists of a distributed life-cycle λ and a family α = {αi}i∈Id and π = {πi}i∈Id
of local labeling functions, where, for each i ∈ Id,
• αi : Evi → Act i associates a local action to each local event, and• πi : Ξi → ℘(Propi) associates a set of local state propositions to each local state.
We denote the tuple ⟨λi, αi, πi⟩ also by µi.
Fig. 1 depicts a distributed life-cycle, where each row comprises the local life-cycle of one agent. In particular, EvA =
{e1, e4, e5, e8, . . .} and→A corresponds to the arrows in A’s row. We can think of the occurrence of the event e1 as leading
agent A from its initial state ∅ to the state {e1}, and then of the occurrence of the event e4 as leading to state {e1, e4}, and so
on. The state-transition sequence of agent A is displayed in Fig. 2. Shared events at communication points are highlighted
by the dotted vertical lines. Note that the numbers annotating the events are there only for convenience since, in general,
no global total order on events is imposed. Fig. 3 shows the corresponding lattice of global states.
2 This statement is only sensible with respect to a given distributed life-cycle. Similar comments also hold for other notions considered below. However,
to ease readability, we omit explicit reference to these dependences whenever they are clear from the context.
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Fig. 3. The lattice of global states.
Fig. 4. Satisfaction of formulas.
We can then define the global satisfaction relation by
• µ  γ if µ, ξ  γ for every ξ ∈ Ξ ,
where the global satisfaction relation at a global state is defined by
• µ, ξ ̸ ⊥;
• µ, ξ  γ ⇒ δ if µ, ξ ̸ γ or µ, ξ  δ;
• µ, ξ  @i[ϕ] if µi, ξ |i i ϕ;
and where the local satisfaction relations at local states are defined by
• µi, ξi i act if ξi ≠ ∅ and αi(last(ξi)) = act;
• µi, ξi i p if p ∈ πi(ξi);
• µi, ξi ̸i ⊥;
• µi, ξi i ϕ⇒ ψ if µi, ξi ̸i ϕ or µi, ξi i ψ;
• µi, ξi i ϕUψ if |ξi| = k and there exists ξ ni ∈ Ξi such that k < nwithµi, ξ ni i ψ , andµi, ξmi i ϕ for every k < m < n;• µi, ξi i ϕ Sψ if |ξi| = k and there exists ξ ni ∈ Ξi such that n < kwithµi, ξ ni i ψ , andµi, ξmi i ϕ for every n < m < k;• µi, ξi i c⃝j[ϕ] if |ξi| > 0, last(ξi) ∈ Evj, and µj, (last(ξi)↓ j) j ϕ.
IfM is a set of interpretation structures, then we writeM  ϕ when µ  ϕ for all µ ∈ M. We will also useMΞ to denote
the set of all pairs ⟨µ, ξ⟩ such that µ ∈ M and ξ is a global state of the distributed life-cycle underlying µ. We say that µ
is a model of Γ ⊆ L if µ globally satisfies each of the formulas in Γ . We say that Γ entails γ ∈ L, written Γ  γ , if every
global model of Γ is also a model of γ . GivenΦ ∪ {ψ} ⊆ Li, we will writeΦ i ψ to denote that every local model ofΦ is
also a model of ψ , or equivalently, that {@i[ϕ] | ϕ ∈ Φ}  @i[ψ].
For instance, the formula @i[p ⇒ F c⃝j[X q]] holds in a model if whenever the proposition p holds locally at a state of
agent i then there must be a future state of agent iwhere he has just synchronized with agent j, for whom qwill hold in the
next state.
Fig. 4 illustrates the satisfaction relation with respect to communication formulas of our running example. Clearly
µ,∅  @B[ψ U c⃝A[ϕ]], because µ, ξ ′  @B[ c⃝A[ϕ]]. Note however that µ, ξ ̸ @B[ c⃝A[ϕ]], although µ, ξ  @A[ϕ].
We now establish general rules for reasoning about different classes of formulas.
Lemma 2.1 (Local Properties). Let ϕ ∈ Li be a local formula and µ an interpretation structure. Let ξ, ξ ′ ∈ Ξ be such that
ξi = ξ ′i . Then µ, ξ  @i[ϕ] if and only if µ, ξ ′  @i[ϕ].
Proof. Straightforward, using the definition of global satisfaction and the assumption ξi = ξ ′i . Namely, µ, ξ  @i[ϕ] iff
µi, ξi i ϕ iff µi, ξ ′i i ϕ iff µ, ξ ′  @i[ϕ]. 
Note thatwhen specifying a distributed systemby specifying the local properties of each agent, itmakes sense to use local
formulas that additionally do not have nested communication. This is because at the specification level, it is not reasonable
to require that an agent in a distributed system can be aware of the communication between other agents. As shown in [34],
every local DTL formula, even with nested communication, can be expressed by a finite set of local formulas without nested
communication.
We now establish a result for local formulas without communication.
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Lemma 2.2 (Private Properties). Let ϕ ∈ L̸ c⃝i be a private formula and µ and µ′ interpretation structures with µi = µ′i . Let
ξ ∈ Ξ and ξ ′ ∈ Ξ ′ be such that ξi = ξ ′i . Then µ, ξ  @i[ϕ] if and only if µ′, ξ ′  @i[ϕ].
Proof. We prove that µi, ξi i ϕ if and only if µ′i, ξ
′
i i ϕ, by induction on ϕ. If ϕ is act then µi, ξi i act iff ξi ≠ ∅ and
αi(last(ξi)) = act iffµ′i, ξ ′i i act. The last equivalence follows fromµi = µ′i and ξi = ξ ′i , ξ ′i ≠ ∅, and α′i(last(ξ ′i )) = act. The
case of p ∈ Prop is similar and the remaining cases follow by the induction hypothesis. Note that ϕ ∈ L̸ c⃝i and thus we do
not consider communication formulas. The main result follows then as expected: µ, ξ  @i[ϕ] iff µi, ξi i ϕ iff (from what
was just proved) µ′i, ξ
′
i i ϕ iff µ
′, ξ ′  @i[ϕ]. 
We also have the following invariance rule for global properties.
Proposition 2.3 (Global Invariance Rule). Let γ ∈ L be a global formula, µ an interpretation structure, and ξ ∈ Ξ a global
state. Suppose that (1) µ, ξ  γ and (2) µ, ξ ′  γ implies µ, ξ ′ ∪ {e}  γ for every ξ ′ ∈ Ξ and e ∈ Ev \ ξ ′ such that ξ ⊆ ξ ′
and ξ ′ ∪ {e} ∈ Ξ . Then µ, ξ ′  γ , for every ξ ′ ∈ Ξ such that ξ ⊆ ξ ′.
Proof. Let ξ ′ be inΞ such that ξ ⊆ ξ ′. The proof follows by induction on ξ ′. If |ξ ′| = |ξ | then ξ ′ = ξ and the result follows
from the first assumption. Assume now that |ξ ′| > |ξ |. Then, ξ ′ = ξ ′′∪{e} for some e ∈ Ev\ξ ′′. By the induction hypothesis,
µ, ξ ′′  γ and so, using the second assumption, it also follows that µ, ξ ′′ ∪ {e}  γ . 
For local state properties, the invariance rule can be stated in the following more familiar way. Its proof is similar to the
proof of Proposition 2.3,mutatis mutandis, and we thus omit it.
Proposition 2.4 (Local Invariance Rule). Let ϕ ∈ Li be a local state formula, µ an interpretation structure, and ξi ∈ Ξi a local
state. Suppose that (1) µi, ξi i ϕ and (2) µi, ξ ′i i ϕ implies µi, ξ
′
i ∪ {next(ξ ′i )}  ϕ for every ξ ′i ∈ Ξi such that ξi ⊆ ξ ′i ( Evi.
Then µi, ξ ′i i ϕ, for every ξ
′
i ∈ Ξi such that ξi ⊆ ξ ′i , or equivalently, µi, ξi i G◦ ϕ.
Hence, µ is a model of @i[ϕ] if and only if µ is a model of both @i[∗ ⇒ ϕ] and @i[(ϕ ∧ X⊤)⇒ Xϕ], or equivalently,
@i[(ϕ ∧ X act)⇒ Xϕ] for every act ∈ Acti.
3. Network and protocol modeling
As we remarked above, DTL supports formal specification and reasoning about models of agents communicating in
distributed systems. In this paper, we focus on security protocols where principals interact by exchangingmessages through
an insecure public channel in an open network. We will specify this network, and protocols on top of it, by defining DTL
theories over suitable signatures, which correspond to classes of models.
Security protocols describe how principals exchange messages, built using cryptographic primitives, in order to obtain
security guarantees. Our presentation is independent of both the specific algebra of messages considered for the different
security protocols and the actions that principals can take during protocol execution. We will thus take both the algebra of
messages and the actions as parameters of our models, considering standard examples for concreteness.
More generally, protocol specifications are parametric in the sense that they prescribe a general recipe for communication
that can be used by different principals playing in the different protocols roles (sender, responder, server, etc.). Themessages
transmitted are bit-strings, but, for our purposes, they can also be taken from any other appropriate set of values and our
results are independent of such details. We just assume fixed a network signature.
Definition 3.1. A network signature is a pair ⟨Princ,Num⟩, where Princ is a finite set of principal identifiers and Num =
Nonces ⊎ SymK ⊎ PubK is a set of ‘‘number’’ symbols used to model atomic data. Num is the union of three disjoint sets:
Nonces is a set of nonce symbols, SymK is a set of symmetric key symbols, and PubK is a set of public key symbols. △
Wewill use upper-case letters like A, B, C, . . . , possibly annotatedwith subscripts and superscripts, to denote principals,
N to denote nonces, and K to denote shared or public keys.
3.1. Messages
The algebra ofmessages tells us howmessages are constructed. Numerous algebras have been considered in the literature
on security protocol analysis, e.g. [26,50], ranging from the free algebra to various formalizations of algebraic properties of
the cryptographic operators employed. The following is a standard example of a free algebra of messages. We will use K−1
to denote the private key that is the inverse of a public key K ∈ PubK , and set PrivK = {K−1 | K ∈ PubK}.
Definition 3.2. Messages, which we denote by M , possibly with annotations, are built inductively from atomic messages
(identifiers and number symbols) and private keys, by pairing, encryption, and hashing. ForM1 andM2 messages, we write
• the pairing ofM1 andM2 asM1;M2,• the symmetric encryption ofM1 byM2 as {|M1|}sM2 ,• the asymmetric encryption ofM1 by K ∈ PubK (respectively, by K−1 ∈ PrivK ) as {|M1|}aK (respectively, {|M1|}aK−1 ), and• the application of a hash function H toM1 as H(M1).
We writeMsg to denote the set of messages. △
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Whenever the distinction between symmetric and asymmetric encryption is unimportant, we simply write {|M1|}M2 . As
usual, we callM2 the key and say thatM1 is in the scope of the encryption; similarly, for H(M), we say thatM is in the scope of
the hash function H . Note that we will often annotate keys with principal names and we will use K both to denote the public
part of the private key K−1 or a symmetric key. Note also that we assume that from a private key K−1 one can compute its
public part K (see, e.g., [61]), which is equivalent to the notion of public–private key pairs that is often also considered. For
this reason, we do not consider the inverse of a private key, namely (K−1)−1. Observe also that, as we will enforce below,
the only ways for a principal to obtain the inverse of a key are to initially know it, to receive it in a message, or when it is a
private key that he freshly generated.
As is often done in symbolic approaches to security protocol analysis, we follow the perfect cryptography assumption,
which postulates that the cryptographic primitives themselves cannot be attacked and hence the only way to decrypt a
message is to possess the appropriate key.We can then define, as is standard, the sets ofmessages that principals can analyze
(decompose) and synthesize (compose), where we have two analysis rules for asymmetric encryption: one for decrypting
with a private key K−1 a messageM that has been asymmetrically encrypted with the corresponding public key K , and one
for decrypting with the public key K a messageM that has been asymmetrically encrypted with a private key K−1 (as usual,
this corresponds to verifying with key K a message that has been signed with key K−1).
Definition 3.3. We write close(S) to denote the closure of a set S of messages under the rules:
M1;M2
M1
Aproj1
M1;M2
M2
Aproj2
{|M|}sK K
M
Asymm
{|M|}aK K−1
M
Apub
{|M|}aK−1 K
M
Apriv
K−1
K
ASprivpub
M1 M2
M1;M2 Spair
M
H(M)
Shash
M K
{|M|}sK
Ssymm
M K
{|M|}aK
Spub
M K−1
{|M|}a
K−1
Spriv
△
With the exception of ASprivpub, all rules are standard and follow the naming convention that rules that decompose
messages are labeled with an A for ‘‘analysis’’ and rules that compose messages with an S for ‘‘synthesis’’. For instance,
Apub and Apriv formalize the decryption of a message encrypted with a public key K and the signature verification of a
message signed with a private key K−1. The ruleASprivpub is both an analysis and a synthesis rule, as it formalizes the notion
of a ‘‘publication function’’ in asymmetric cryptographic systems: given a private key K−1, a publication function computes
the corresponding public key K .
Based on these closure rules, we give the following definitions of the content and of the immediate parts of a message,
which essentially invert the analysis rules and the synthesis rules, respectively.We then prove some useful properties about
sets of secure messages.
Definition 3.4. The content of a messageM is the set cont(M) of messages defined inductively by
cont(M) =

{M} ifM ∈ Num, orM = H(M1) for someM1,
{K−1} ∪ cont(K) ifM = K−1 ∈ PrivK ,
{M} ∪ cont(M1) ∪ cont(M2) ifM = M1;M2,
{M} ∪ cont(M1) ifM = {|M1|}K .
WhenM ′ ∈ cont(M), we will often say thatM contains M ′ or thatM ′ is contained in M . △
Definition 3.5. The immediate parts of a messageM is the set parts(M) of messages defined by
parts(M) =

∅ ifM = N ∈ Nonces orM = K ∈ SymK orM = K−1 ∈ PrivK ,
{K−1} ifM = K ∈ PubK ,
{M1,M2} ifM = M1;M2,
{M1, K} ifM = {|M1|}K ,
{M1} ifM = H(M1). △
Let S ⊆ Msg be a set of secret messages, i.e. messages that should not be disclosed.We can then define S-securemessages
as follows.
Definition 3.6. For S ⊆ Msg , an S-secure encryption is either a symmetric encryption {|M|}sK with K ∈ S or an asymmetric
encryption {|M|}aK with K−1 ∈ S. A messageM is said to be S-secure if each occurrence of an element of S in the content ofM
appears either under the scope of an S-secure encryption or under the scope of hashing. A message is S-insecure if it is not
S-secure. We write S-Sec to denote the set of all S-secure messages. △
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The set S-Secmessages contains precisely all themessages that can be safely exchanged over an insecure networkwithout
revealing the secrets in S. If a messageM is S-insecure, then some element of S must appear in the content ofM outside the
scope of any S-secure encryption or hashing. In that case, we say that the element occurs in the clear (with respect to S). We
can then prove the two following properties.
Proposition 3.7. If S ⊆ Msg then S-Sec ∩ S = ∅.
This is straightforward: ifM ∈ S thenM is not S-secure becauseM itself occurs in the clear.
For reasonable sets of S of secrets, we expect that S-Sec is closed. For instance, it would not make sense to requireM1;M2
to be a secret if one allowed bothM1 andM2 to be disclosed.
Definition 3.8. We call a set (of secrets) S ⊆ Msg rational if whenever S contains a message M and parts(M) ≠ ∅ then
parts(M) ∩ S ≠ ∅. △
This covers the case when S consists only of atomic data and private keys.
Proposition 3.9. For every rational set S, we have that close(S-Sec) = S-Sec.
Proof. Clearly, it suffices to prove that close(S-Sec) ⊆ S-Sec. The proof builds on Proposition 3.7 and proceeds by induction
on the closure rules. Many of the cases are simple and do not even rely on the rationality of the set S. Below are three of the
more interesting cases.
Spair: If M1;M2 /∈ S-Sec, then some element of S must occur in the clear in the content of M1;M2. Then either it occurs
in the clear in the content of M1 and therefore M1 /∈ S-Sec, or it occurs in the clear in the content of M2 and therefore
M2 /∈ S-Sec, or elseM1;M2 is itself in S. Since S is a rational set,M1 orM2 must also be in S, and thus not in S-Sec.
Spub: If {|M|}aK /∈ S-Sec, then some element of S must occur in the clear in the content of {|M|}aK . Then either it occurs in
the clear in the content of M (and the asymmetric encryption is not S-secure, in which case K−1 /∈ S) and thus M /∈ S-Sec,
or {|M|}aK is itself in S. Since S is a rational set,M or K must also be in S, and thus not in S-Sec.
Spriv: If {|M|}aK−1 /∈ S-Sec, then some element of S must occur in the clear in the content of {|M|}aK−1 . Then either it occurs
in the clear in the content ofM and thusM /∈ S-Sec, or {|M|}a
K−1 is itself in S. Since S is a rational set,M or K
−1 must also be
in S, and thus not in S-Sec. 
3.2. A channel-based model
A channel-based signature ΣCB is a distributed signature obtained from a network signature ⟨Princ,Num⟩ by taking
Id = Princ ⊎ {Ch}, where Ch is the communication channel (used to model asynchronous communication), and defining
the action symbols and state propositions of each agent. As an example, consider the following signature of a principal A,
whose actions ActA are
• send(M, B): sending the messageM to B,
• rec(M): receiving the messageM ,
• spy(M): eavesdropping the messageM , and
• fresh(X): generating a fresh X ∈ Nonces ⊎ SymK ⊎ PrivK .
A’s state propositions PropA are
• knows(M): A knows the messageM .
For the channel, Ch, we do not require state propositions, i.e. PropCh = ∅, whereas the actions ActCh include
• in(A,M, B): the messageM , sent by A, arrives on the channel, addressed to B,
• out(A,M, B): the messageM , sent by A, is delivered from the channel to B, and
• leak: leaking of a message.
These actions reflect that the underlying network may be hostile: sending actions name the intended recipient but
receiving actions do not name the message’s sender. In fact, we assume, as is standard, that a principal may behave as a
Dolev–Yao intruder [33] who can compose, send, and intercept messages at will, but, following the perfect cryptography
assumption, cannot break cryptography. Our results, however, are independent of the particular intruder capabilities. We
useLCB to denote the DTL language over the channel-based signatureΣCB.
The network model we consider here suffices to abstractly formalize and reason about the properties of communication
between principals executing security protocols, as well as about protocol models. This model could, of course, be extended
in many ways. For example, we could include additional message constructors, additional actions and state propositions, or
variants of the ones given, or we could even include servers and additional channels with distinct accessibility and reliability
properties (see Section 5 for some examples).
In the channel-based networkmodel CB that we define, principals can send and receivemessages at will, always through
the channel. If the principal A sends a message to B, then the message synchronously arrives at the channel, where it is
stored for future delivery to B. If delivery ever happens, it must be synchronized with the corresponding receive action
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of B. However, the principal A can only send M to B if A knows both the name B and how to produce the message M . As
usual, the knowledge of principals is not static. In addition to their initial knowledge, principals gain knowledge from the
messages they receive and the fresh data they generate (nonces, symmetric keys, and private keys). Principals may also spy
onmessages leaked by the channel and learn their content. We do not allow principals to explicitly divert messages, but we
also do not guarantee that messages delivered to the channel are ever received.
To ensure that principals only learn new information from the messages they receive and the fresh data they generate,
we require that the knows proposition only holds where necessary. We restrict attention to those interpretation structures
µ such that, for every principal A, the following condition holds for all messagesM and non-empty local states ξA:
(K) µ, ξA A knows(M) iffM ∈ close({M ′ | µ, ξA A (Y knows(M ′)) ∨ rec(M ′) ∨ spy(M ′) ∨ fresh(M ′)})
(K) implies that, in every model µ = ⟨λ, α, π⟩ of the specification, π is completely determined by λ and α, given πA(∅) for
each A ∈ Princ. This is equivalent to saying that the knowledge of each principal only depends on its initial knowledge and
on the actions that have occurred. A number of other useful properties follow from (K), e.g., for each principal A ∈ Princ:
@A[knows(M1;M2)⇔ (knows(M1) ∧ knows(M2))] (K1)
@A[(knows(M) ∧ knows(K))⇒ knows({|M|}K )] (K2)
@A[(knows({|M|}sK ) ∧ knows(K))⇒ knows(M)] (K3.1)
@A[(knows({|M|}aK ) ∧ knows(K−1))⇒ knows(M)] (K3.2)
@A[knows(M)⇒ G◦ knows(M)] (K4)
@A[rec(M)⇒ knows(M)] (K5)
@A[spy(M)⇒ knows(M)] (K6)
@A[fresh(X)⇒ knows(X)] (K7)
To guarantee the freshness and uniqueness of the data generated by each principal, we also require the following axioms,
whereM ranges over all messages such that cont(X) ∩ cont(M) ≠ ∅.
(F1) @A[fresh(X)⇒ Y¬ knows(M)]
(F2) @A[fresh(X)] ⇒B∈Princ\{A} c⃝B[¬ knows(M)]
Together with (K7), (F1) and (F2) guarantee that every fresh data item is generated at most once, if at all, in each model,
and always freshly (also taking into account agents’ initial knowledge). The specification of the networkmodel also contains
axioms that characterize the behavior of the channel Ch and of each principal A ∈ Princ.
(C1) @Ch[in(A,M, B)≫A send(M, B)]
(C2) @Ch[out(A,M, B)⇒ P in(A,M, B)]]
(C3) @Ch[out(A,M, B)≫B rec(M)]
(C4) @Ch[leak⇒ (B∈Princ c⃝B[⊤])]
(P1) @A[send(M, B)⇒ Y(knows(M) ∧ knows(B))]
(P2) @A[send(M, B)≫Ch in(A,M, B)]
(P3) @A[rec(M)≫Ch (C∈Princ out(C,M, A))]
(P4) @A[spy(M)≫Ch (leak ∧ P B,C∈Princ in(B,M, C))]
(P5) @A[B∈Princ\{A} ¬ c⃝B[⊤]]
(P6) @A[fresh(X)⇒¬ c⃝Ch[⊤]]
The channel axioms (C1)–(C3) are straightforward. They state that a message addressed to A only arrives at the channel if it
is sent to A by some principal B; the channel only delivers a message to A if the message for A previously arrived; and if the
channel delivers a message to A, then A receives it. (C4) states that when the channel is leaking, some principal is listening.
The principal axioms are also simple. (P1) states a precondition for sending a message: the sender must know both the
message and the recipient beforehand. (P2)–(P3) are interaction axioms. (P2) and (P3) state that the sending and receiving
of messages must be shared with the corresponding arrival and delivery actions of the channel. (P4) guarantees that a spied
message must have arrived at the channel, addressed to some recipient. The last two axioms limit the possible interactions:
(P5) guarantees that principals never communicate directly (only through the channel) and (P6) states that actions that
generate fresh data are not communication actions.
As our aim is to provide a foundation for modeling security protocols, we will further add, for simplicity, a number of
standard restrictions. To start with, we assume there exists a special principal Z ∈ Princ , also known as the intruder. As is
well known, it suffices to consider one Dolev–Yao intruder, instead of several ones. This can be formally proved using DTL,
whichwe have done in [16] by showing that one intruder is enough (along the lines of the ‘‘two (honest) agents are sufficient’’
result of [24]). We define the set of honest principals to be Hon = Princ \ {Z}.3 To make sense of the terminology, we must
3 Given this distinction between the intruder and the honest participants, we could rewrite several of the axioms by distinguishing the nature of the
principals involved, but we refrain from doing so for brevity.
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of course ensure that honest principals do not act dishonestly, namely by spying messages. Thus, for every A ∈ Hon, we
require also that:
(Hon) @A[¬ spy(M)], for every messageM .
We further assume that Z does not send a message to principal A if A will not receive it, or if that same message has
already been sent to A. Namely, we assume the following axioms:
(EZ1) @Z [send(M, A)⇒ c⃝Ch[F out(Z,M, A)]] and
(EZ2) @Z [send(M, A)⇒ c⃝Ch[¬ P

B∈Princ in(B,M, A)]].
This represents a common simplification, which can be made without loss of generality. As shown, for instance in [16], such
assumptions do not compromise the model with respect to its ability to represent security-sensitive behaviors, as we will
introduce below.
The CBmodels µwill be those interpretation structures overΣCB satisfying all these properties.
3.3. Modeling security protocols
In this section, we show how to model protocols and properties on top of our channel-based network model. In a typical
situation, we will assume a network signature where each principal A ∈ Princ is assigned a private key denoted by K−1A ,
whose corresponding public key is the atom KA. Whereas it is possible (even desirable) that other principals know A’s public
key, we will assume that, at least initially, K−1A is known only by A. We formalize this as follows:
(aKey1) @A[∗ ⇒ knows(K−1A )]
(aKey2) @B[∗ ⇒ ¬ knows(M)], for every B ∈ Princ \ {A} and everyM containing K−1A
Similarly, we may assume that there exist symmetric shared atomic keys KAB for each pair of principals A, B ∈ Princ. As
above, we require that KAB is initially known only by A and B:
(sKey1.1) @A[∗ ⇒ knows(KAB)]
(sKey1.2) @B[∗ ⇒ knows(KAB)]
(sKey2) @C [∗ ⇒ ¬ knows(M)], for every C ∈ Princ \ {A, B} and everyM containing KAB
We may also assume, for simplicity, that all principals A, B ∈ Princ know each other’s names and public keys from the
very beginning.
(N) @A[∗ ⇒ knows(B)]
(PK) @A[∗ ⇒ knows(KB)]
Such properties may influence the executability of the protocol by the participants, as we have also discussed in [18]. Here,
we will simply assume that the initial knowledge of the principals guarantees that the protocols can be executed.
There are several approaches to extracting formal protocol specifications from a protocol description in Alice-and-Bob-
style notation, i.e., as a sequence ofmessage exchange steps. Rather than going through the general case,wewill illustrate the
method by modeling the standard example of the (flawed) simplified Needham–Schroeder Public Key Protocol NSPK [42].
The formalization steps we take are straightforward and they would not be difficult to generate automatically from such an
Alice-and-Bob-style protocol description, as explained, for instance, in [18,39,44,50].
The NSPK protocol can be described by the following sequence of message exchanges.
(msg1) a → b : (n1). {|n1; a|}aKb
(msg2) b → a : (n2). {|n1; n2|}aKa
(msg3) a → b : {|n2|}aKb
In this notation, a and b are variables identifying the principals playing in the different protocol roles (initiator and
responder), n1 and n2 are variables representing the nonces created by these principals, and the arrows represent
communication from the sender to the receiver. The parenthesized nonces prefixing the first two messages signify that
these nonces are freshly generated before the message is sent. Moreover, it is assumed that the principals’ public keys
have been distributed before the protocol starts (or else a and b would not be able to construct the messages). This can be
straightforwardly expressed by appropriate instances of the axioms (N) and (PK).
Formalizing a protocol like the above involves defining the sequences of actions (send, rec, and fresh) taken by
agents executing each protocol role. Specifically, given concrete principals A and B and fresh nonces N1 and N2, the role
instantiations should correspond to the execution, by principal A, of the sequence of actions runInitA (A, B,N1,N2):
⟨fresh(N1).send({|N1; A|}aKB , B).rec({|N1;N2|}aKA).send({|N2|}aKB , B)⟩ ,
and to the execution, by principal B, of the sequence runRespB (A, B,N1,N2):
⟨rec({|N1; A|}aKB).fresh(N2).send({|N1;N2|}aKA , A).rec({|N2|}aKB)⟩ .
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In general, an Alice-and-Bob-style protocol description P may involve j principal identifier variables a1, . . . , aj,
corresponding to j distinct roles, and k fresh data variables f1, . . . , fk (standing for the freshly created nonces, symmetric
keys, or private asymmetric keys), and consist of a sequence ⟨msg1 . . .msgm⟩ of message exchanges, each of the form
(msgq) as → ar : (fq1 , . . . , fqt ).M ,
whereM can include any of the principal identifiers and fresh data variables.
A protocol instantiation is a variable substitution σ such that each σ(ai) ∈ Princ and each σ(fi) ∈ Nonces⊎ SymK ⊎ PrivK .
Moreover, while the intruder can play different roles in a protocol instantiation, we require that honest agents do not play
two roles in the same instantiation. Of course, this does not prevent the same honest agent from playing the same or other
roles in other protocol instantiations. Hence, if σ(ai1), σ (ai2) ∈ Hon and σ(ai1) = σ(ai2) then i1 = i2. We extend σ to
messages, actions, sequences, formulas, and indices in the natural way. For example, σ(Kai) = Kσ(ai). Each instantiation
prescribes a concrete sequence of actions to be executed by each participant in a protocol run: for each role i, we have the
corresponding sequence runi = msg i1  · · · msg im where
msg iq =

⟨fresh(fq1) · · · fresh(fqt ).send(M, ar)⟩ if i = s,
⟨rec(M)⟩ if i = r ,
⟨⟩ if i ≠ s and i ≠ r .
If σ(ai) = A, we write runiA(σ ) = σ(runi). We can easily formalize the complete execution by principal A of the run
corresponding to role i of the protocol, under the protocol instantiation σ . If runiA(σ ) = ⟨act1 · · · actn⟩ thenwe can formalize
A’s execution by the local formula roleiA(σ ):
actn ∧ P(actn−1 ∧ P(. . . ∧ P act1) . . . ).
In general, if we denote the set of all protocol instantiations by Inst , we can define the set RunsiA of all possible concrete
runs of principal A in role i, and the set RunsA of all of A’s possible concrete runs in any of the j roles:
RunsiA =

σ∈Inst
{runiA(σ ) | σ(ai) = A ∈ Princ} and RunsA =
j
i=1
RunsiA.
It should be clear that µ, ξ  @A[roleiA(σ )] if and only if A has just completed the required sequence of actions runiA(σ ) at
ξ . Often, in examples, we will use a = ⟨a1 · · · aj⟩ and f = ⟨f1 · · · fk⟩, and write runiA(σ (a), σ (f )) instead of runiA(σ ), and
roleiA(σ (a), σ (f )) instead of role
i
A(σ ).
In addition to the assumption that no honest agent ever plays two different roles in the same run, we also require that
honest principals strictly follow the protocol. Therefore, if the local life-cycle of A ∈ Hon is e1 →A e2 →A e3 →A . . . , we
require that the corresponding (possibly infinite) sequence of actions
w(A) = ⟨αA(e1).αA(e2).αA(e3) . . . ⟩
must be an interleaving of prefixes of sequences in RunsA, but using distinct fresh data in each of them. Formally, we say
that two distinct sequences of actions w and w′ are independent provided that if wi = fresh(X) for some i ≤ |w| and
some X , and w′j = fresh(Y ) for some j ≤ |w′| and some Y , then X ≠ Y . The requirement on protocol models can now be
rigorously defined. For each A ∈ Hon, there must exist a set W ⊆ RunsA of pairwise independent sequences such that for
every i ≤ |w(A)| it is possible to choosew ∈ W , j ≤ |w|, and i1 < · · · < ij = i satisfyingw(A)ik = wk for all k, where k ≤ j.
We will use the protocol name P to denote the resulting set of models.
Note that this is similar to approaches such as [55], where the behavior of an honest agent A is defined inductively so
that the ith action of a sequencew ∈ RunsA can be executed only if the previous i− 1 actions have been executed. It is also
similar to strand spaces [17,62,63] where essentially the same sequences of RunsA are used to model honest agents. In all
cases, the intruder can act freely, according to the standard Dolev–Yao capabilities.
In the case of NSPK models, the life-cycle of each honest agent must be built by interleaving prefixes of sequences of the
form runInitA (A, B
′,N1,N2) or runRespA (B′, A,N1,N2), where no two such initiator runs can have the same N1, no two responder
runs can have the same N2, and the N1 of an initiator run must be different from the N2 of any responder run.
3.4. Security goals
The aim of security protocol analysis is to prove (or disprove) the correctness of a protocol with respect to the security
goals that the protocol should achieve. For instance, the secrecy of the critical data exchanged during a protocol’s execution
is one such goal. In addition, an honest principal running the protocol may wish to authenticate the identities of its protocol
partners based on the messages he receives. There are many approaches to specifying secrecy and authentication in the
literature, depending in part on the underlying model used. However, the various approaches usually agree on the general
picture. Below, we show how to formulate secrecy and authentication goals for protocols in the general case and use the
NSPK protocol as an illustration.
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As usual, given a protocol and a security goal, we call an attack any protocol model µ and state ξ for which the formula
expressing the goal does not hold. Let us start with secrecy.
3.4.1. Secrecy
We formalize that the messages in a finite set S will remain a shared secret between the participants A1, . . . , Aj after the
complete execution of a protocol under the instantiation σ , with each σ(ai) ∈ Princ , by the formula secrS(σ ):
j
i=1
@Ai [P◦ roleiAi(σ )] ⇒

B∈Princ\{A1,...,Aj}

M∈S
@B[¬ knows(M)].
Of course, this property can be expected to hold only in particular situations. Assume that all the participants are honest,
that is, each Ai ∈ Hon. One might then expect that the ‘‘critical’’ fresh data generated during the run will remain a secret
shared only by the participating principals. Indeed, being honest, they will not reuse this fresh data in subsequent protocol
runs. Using the logic, we can check the property secrσ(F)(σ ) for the relevant set of fresh data variables F ⊆ {f1, . . . , fk}. As
before, we sometimes write secrσ(F)(σ (a), σ (f )) instead of secrσ(F)(σ ).
In the case of the NSPK protocol, this amounts to requiring that secr {N1,N2}(A, B,N1,N2) holds, with A and B both honest.
3.4.2. Authentication
There aremany possible notions of authentication, e.g., the authentication hierarchy of [43]. Inmost cases, authentication
formalizes some kind of correspondence property between the messages an agent receives in a protocol run and the
messages that the other participants of the same run are supposed to have sent. The typical (weak) authentication goal
states that if an honest principal A completes his part of a run of a protocol in role i, with certain partners and data, then it
must be the case that these partners have actually sent to A the messages that A received.
Letσ be a protocol instantiation such thatσ(ai) = A ∈ Hon andσ(aj) = B ∈ Princ . Then the property thatA authenticates
B in role j at message q of the protocol can be defined in our logic by the formula authi,j,qA,B (σ ), which is
@A[roleiA(σ )] ⇒ @B[P◦ send(σ (M), A)],
assuming that the protocolmessagemsgq requires that aj sends themessageM to ai. Wewould therefore require auth
i,j,q
A,B (σ )
to hold whenever message q is considered essential for authentication. As before, we sometimes write authi,j,qA,B (σ (a), σ (f ))
instead of authi,j,qA,B (σ ).
In the case of the NSPK protocol we can specify, for an honest principal A acting as initiator, the authentication of the
responder B at message 2 using authInit,Resp,2A,B (A, B,N1,N2) as
@A[roleInitA (A, B,N1,N2)] ⇒ @B[P◦ send({|N1;N2|}aKA , A)].
Analogously, for an honest principal B acting as responder, the authentication of the initiator A at message 3 using
authResp,Init,3B,A (A, B,N1,N2) is
@B[roleRespB (A, B,N1,N2)] ⇒ @A[P◦ send({|N2|}aKB , B)].
This last property fails due to the man-in-the-middle attack on NSPK [42], as we show below.
4. A meta-level secrecy result and object-level applications
In this section, we show how DTL can be used as an object logic for both protocol verification and falsification.
In particular, we show that the responder fails to authenticate the initiator in the NSPK protocol, formalized in the
previous section. Afterward, we verify Lowe’s corrected version of this protocol. For this proof, however, we leverage
DTL as a metalogic and first prove a general metatheorem about sufficient conditions for data to remain secret during
communication. Our verification of the corrected protocol follow as a direct application of this general result.
4.1. Secret data
The result thatwewill prove is a good example of the kind ofmeta-level property that any suitable networkmodel should
enjoy. We use the properties of secure messages proved in Section 3 to reason about secrecy in a protocol-independent way
and afterward prove a proposition about secrecy properties in protocol models.
Let S ⊆ Msg be a set of secret messages, that is, messages that should not be disclosed. The following lemma states that,
given a group of principals G ⊆ Princ , if all the fresh data in S originates from principals inG, then the secrets in S will remain
unknown outside of G as long as the principals in G only send S-secure messages.
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Lemma 4.1 (Secret Data). Let S be a rational set of messages, G ⊆ Princ be a group of principals, andµ be a network model such
that
µ 

A∈G @A[∗ ⇒ (knows(X) ∨ F fresh(X))] for each X ∈ (Nonces ⊎ SymK ⊎ PrivK) ∩ S. (i)
Given a global state ξ of µ with
µ, ξ 

B∈Princ\G @B[¬ knows(M)] for every M /∈ S-Sec (ii)
then, for every global state ξ ′ ⊇ ξ of µ, either
µ, ξ ′ 

B∈Princ\G @B[¬ knows(M)] for every M /∈ S-Sec (iii)
or else there exists M /∈ S-Sec such that
µ, ξ ′ 

A∈G,C∈Princ @A[P◦ send(M, C)]. (iv)
Proof. Weassume (i) and (ii), and prove either (iii) or (iv) for every global state ξ ′ ⊇ ξ ofµ. The proof proceeds by induction,
using the global invariance rule of Proposition 2.3. The rule’s base case (1), with ξ ′ = ξ , is trivial, as in this case (iii) coincides
(ii). We turn to the step case (2), and must show that assuming, by induction hypothesis, that either (iii) or (iv) hold for ξ ′,
then (iii) or (iv) must also hold for any extended global ξ ′ ∪ {e}.
By definition, if (iv) holds for ξ ′, then it also holds for ξ ′ ∪ {e}. Thus, we are left with proving that if (iii) holds for ξ ′, then
(iii) or (iv) hold for ξ ′ ∪ {e}. Suppose then that (iii) holds for ξ ′ but not for ξ ′ ∪ {e}, that is µ, ξ ′ ∪ {e}  @B[knows(M)] for
some S-insecure messageM and some B /∈ G. Then, by Lemma 2.1, it must be the case that e ∈ EvB, and so the local states of
all other principals do not change (see axiom (P5)). Moreover, αB(e) cannot be a sending action since this would not change
the knowledge of principal B (see condition (K)). If αB(e) was either rec(M ′) or spy(M ′) then, using Proposition 3.9 and the
assumption that (iii) holds for ξ ′, it would follow that M ′ /∈ S-Sec. However, since M ′ must have been previously sent to
the channel (by the axioms (P3), (C2), (P4), and (C1)), axiom (P1) implies that such a message could only have been sent by
some A ∈ G. Hence, one would have µ, ξ ′ ∪ {e} A∈G,C∈Princ @A[P◦ send(M ′, C)], i.e., (iv) would hold for ξ ′ ∪ {e}. The only
remaining possibility is a fresh action. However, it cannot be fresh(X) for some X ∈ S, independently of whether X is a nonce,
a symmetric key, or a private key, as this, together with the freshness conditions ((F1-2), (K7), (aKey1), (sKey1.1− 2)) and
the fact that B /∈ G, would contradict condition (i), and the result follows. 
Note that the set Msg \ S-Sec of S-insecure messages corresponds to what is called an ideal in the context of strand
spaces [62]. However, here we have defined it in a more general setting that also includes composed keys and hashing.
Similarly, the set S-Sec of S-secure messages corresponds to a coideal in the terminology of [27,47].
Lemma 4.1 above is a general, protocol-independent result about the network data flow. It can be used to reason about
secrecy properties in protocol models and is similar to results obtained for PCL [56], which in turn generalize those found
in [16,27,47], e.g., to include composed keys and hashing. Indeed, under reasonable conditions, the secrecy of freshly
generated data can easily be seen to hold. Recall that we assume that each principal A initially has a private key, denoted by
K−1A , and that each pair of principals A and B initially shares a symmetric key, denoted by KAB, subject to the key axioms
(aKey1), (aKey2), (sKey1.1), (sKey1.2) and (sKey2) given in Section 3.3. If the protocol at hand does not require the
existence of some of these initially distributed keys, then the result still holds if we simply remove the unused keys from
the set S.
Proposition 4.2 (Secrecy). Aprotocol guarantees secrσ(F)(σ ) for an instantiationσ of the fresh dataσ(F) generated in a protocol
run by honest participants σ(a1) = A1, . . . , σ (aj) = Aj provided that all the messages ever sent by A1, . . . , Aj in any protocol
run are S-Secure, for S = ({K−1Ai | 1 ≤ i ≤ j} ∪ {KAiAk | 1 ≤ i, k ≤ j, i ≠ k} ∪ σ(F)).
Proof. The result follows from Lemma 4.1 using G = {A1, . . . , Aj}. To begin with, S is a rational set. Let µ be a network
model and ξ a global state and assume that µ, ξ 
j
i=1 @Ai [P◦ roleiAi(σ )]. Condition (i) of the lemma follows as all the
corresponding roles of the protocol have been completed and therefore all fresh data in σ(F) is generated in µ among
the principals in G. Moreover, for the initial state ∅, clearly, no principal outside G knows S-insecure messages. For fresh
nonces, condition (ii) follows directly from axioms (F1− 2). For private and shared keys, condition (ii) follows from the
axioms (aKey2) and (sKey2). Using the lemma, we then have that (iii) or (iv) must hold for any global state of µ. However,
the assumption that A1, . . . , Aj only send S-secure messages rules out the possibility that condition (iv) of Lemma 4.1 ever
holds. Hence, (iii) must be the case also at ξ , i.e., µ, ξ 

B∈Princ\G @B[¬ knows(M)] for every M /∈ S-Sec. It follows that
µ, ξ 

B∈Princ\{A1,...,Aj}

M∈σ(F) @B[¬ knows(M)], and the secrecy property holds. 
Note that our assumption that all the messages sent by A1, . . . , Aj in any protocol run are S-secure corresponds to the
notion of discreetness of [27,47].
4.2. Object-level analysis of NSPK
We will now illustrate the use of DTL as an object logic using two well-known examples: the NSPK protocol and its
corrected version by Lowe.
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Fig. 5.Man-in-the-middle attack to NSPK.
4.2.1. Protocol falsification
Recall that in the previous section, we formalized the NSPK protocol and the property that the responder authenticates
the initiator: authResp,Init,3B,A (A, B,N1,N2). We now show that this cannot be proved by presenting a model that falsifies it. The
model formalizes thewell-knownman-in-the-middle attack discovered by Lowe [42], where the intruder Z makes B believe
he has run the protocol with A. It illustrates how concrete execution scenarios can be formalized as DTL models.
Fig. 5 presents this model. It is straightforward to see that it satisfies all of the axioms of the channel model presented in
Section 3. For example, (C1) and (P2) are globally satisfied because every in action is synchronizedwith a corresponding send
action by the same principal and vice versa. Another example is (P1), which says that only known messages are sent. This
holds for each of the 5 send actions. For example, for send2, the intruder must know {|N1; A|}aKB , which is the case because he
previously received {|N1; A|}aKZ , which he can decrypt, and because he also knows public keys, in particular KB. Additionally,
the antecedent of our authentication formula, @B[roleRespB (A, B,N1,N2)], is satisfied at the global state ξ since the responder
B has completed his role. In particular, rec2, fresh2, send3, and rec5 are the actions that are required by B to complete his role.
However, the consequent @A[P◦ send({|N2|}aKB , B)] is not satisfied at ξ because there is no previous action send({|N2|}aKB , B).
Hence, this model is a counter-example to our authentication property as it shows that NSPK ̸ authResp,Init,3B,A (A, B,N1,N2).
4.2.2. Protocol verification
We now show that the authentication property authResp,Init,3B,A (A, B,N1,N2) for honest B, which failed for NSPK, actually
holds for the NSL protocol [42] given below:
(msg1) a → b : (n1). {|n1; a|}aKb
(msg2) b → a : (n2). {|n1; n2; b|}aKa
(msg3) a → b : {|n2|}aKb
Again, we have two roles: an initiator role Init , represented by a, and a responder role Resp, represented by b. Given
principals A and B and nonces N1 and N2, the role instantiations should correspond to the execution by principal A of the
sequence of actions runInitA (A, B,N1,N2):
⟨fresh(N1).send({|N1; A|}aKB , B).rec({|N1;N2; B|}aKA).send({|N2|}aKB , B)⟩,
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and to the execution by principal B of the sequence runRespB (A, B,N1,N2):
⟨rec({|N1; A|}aKB).fresh(N2).send({|N1;N2; B|}aKA , A).rec({|N2|}aKB)⟩.
Prior to showing in Proposition 4.5 that this protocol authenticates the initiator, we prove two lemmas. The first lemma
allows us to conclude that if A is also honest and does not send the requiredmessage {|N2|}aKB to B, then no other agent would
ever have the means to do it either.
Lemma 4.3. Let A, B ∈ Hon, µ be a NSL model, and ξ a global state such that
µ, ξ  @B[fresh(N2) ∧ F send({|N1;N2; B|}aKA , A)].
For every global state ξ ′ ⊇ ξ , if
µ, ξ ′ ̸ @A[P◦ send({|N2|}aKB , B)]
then, for every C,D, E ∈ Princ with E ∉ {A, B}, and every message M which is not {N2, K−1A }-secure, or M contains N2 outside a
submessage {|N1;N2; B|}aKA , the following holds:
µ, ξ ′ ̸ @Ch[P◦ in(C,M,D)] and µ, ξ ′ ̸ @E[knows(M)].
Proof. We prove this with the help of Lemma 4.1. Let G = {A, B} and S = {N2, K−1A } ∪ {M | M contains N2 outside
a submessage {|N1;N2; B|}aKA}. It is not difficult to check that S is a rational set. Indeed, parts(N2) = parts(K−1A ) = ∅ and,
for each of the remaining messagesM , either N2 ∈ parts(M) and parts(M) ∩ S ≠ ∅ orM ′ ∈ parts(M) for some messageM ′
that contains N2 outside a submessage {|N1;N2; B|}aKA . But, in this case,M ′ ∈ S and so parts(M) ∩ S ≠ ∅.
Next, we establish condition (i) of Lemma 4.1. The only relevant atoms in S are N2 and K−1A . As µ, ξ  @B[fresh(N2)], it
follows that µ  @B[∗ ⇒ F fresh(N2)]. For K−1A , it follows from axiom (aKey1) that µ  @A[∗ ⇒ knows(K−1A )].
Now, let E ∉ G and suppose that µ, ξ  @E[knows(M)]. From µ, ξ  @B[fresh(N2)] and the freshness axioms (F1-2)
it follows not only that M is {N2}-secure, but also that M does not even contain N2. Furthermore, axiom (aKey2) and
the honesty of A guarantee that all the messages ever in the channel, or known by some principal other than A, are
{K−1A }-secure. Thus, the message M is S-secure. This implies that condition (ii) of Lemma 4.1 holds, which tells us that for
every global state ξ ′ ⊇ ξ of µ either condition (iii) or condition (iv) of Lemma 4.1 must hold.
We proceed to show that condition (iv) cannot hold. Concretely, we prove by global induction on ξ ′ ⊇ ξ that if
µ, ξ ′ ̸ @A[P◦ send({|N2|}aKB , B)] then condition (iii) of Lemma 4.1 holds for ξ ′ and condition (iv) of Lemma 4.1 does not. The
base case with ξ ′ = ξ is simple: the same argument that we used to show that condition (ii) of Lemma 4.1 holds, together
with axiom (P1), establishes that condition (iv) cannot hold at ξ . For the induction step, let us assume that ξ ′∪{e} ⊃ ξ ′ ⊇ ξ
are global states and that, by the induction hypothesis, if µ, ξ ′ ̸ @A[P◦ send({|N2|}aKB , B)] then (iii) holds for ξ ′ and (iv) does
not. Since, by Lemma 4.1, we know that (iii) or (iv) must hold, it suffices to show that ifµ, ξ ′ ∪ {e} ̸ @A[P◦ send({|N2|}aKB , B)]
then (iv) cannot hold for ξ ′ ∪ {e}. We must then consider, in turn, the two relevant cases for condition (iv) to hold, that is,
e ∈ EvA and e ∈ EvB.
Case (1): If e ∈ EvA, we analyze the possible sending actions αA(e).
(1.1) If αA(e) = send({|N∗1 ; A|}aKX , X), it must be in a prefix
⟨fresh(N∗1 ).send({|N∗1 ; A|}aKX , X)⟩
of an initiator run of the protocol with some X ∈ Princ. As A freshly generated N∗1 , and B freshly generated N2, the
freshness axioms (F1-2) guarantee that N∗1 ≠ N2. Therefore, the messageM = {|N∗1 ; A|}aKX ∈ S-Sec .
(1.2) If αA(e) = send({|N∗1 ;N∗2 ; A|}aKX , X), it must be in a prefix
⟨rec({|N∗1 ; X |}aKA).fresh(N∗2 ).send({|N∗1 ;N∗2 ; A|}aKX , X)⟩
of a responder run of the protocol with some X ∈ Princ. As A freshly generated N∗2 , and B freshly generated N2, the
freshness axioms (F1-2) guarantee that N∗2 ≠ N2. Moreover, A first received {|N∗1 ; X |}aKA from the channel, and axioms
(P3), (C2), (C1), (P1) together with the induction hypothesis guarantee that N∗1 ≠ N2. Therefore,M = {|N∗1 ;N∗2 ; A|}aKX ∈
S-Sec as in case (1.1) above.
(1.3) If αA(e) = send({|N∗2 |}aKX , X), it must be in a complete initiator run
⟨fresh(N∗1 ).send({|N∗1 ; A|}aKX , X).rec({|N∗1 ;N∗2 ; X |}aKA).send({|N∗2 |}aKX , X)⟩
of the protocol with some X ∈ Princ . If, by absurdity, N∗2 = N2, then as A would first receive {|N∗1 ;N2; X |}aKA from the
channel, it would follow from axioms (P3), (C2), (C1), (P1) and the induction hypothesis that N∗1 = N1 and X = B. But
this would contradict µ, ξ ′ ∪ {e} ̸ @A[P◦ send({|N2|}aKB , B)]. Hence, N∗2 ≠ N2 andM = {|N∗2 |}aKX ∈ S-Sec .
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Case (2): If e ∈ EvB, we also analyze the possible sending actions αB(e).
(2.1) If αB(e) = send({|N∗1 ; B|}aKX , X), it must be in a prefix
⟨fresh(N∗1 ).send({|N∗1 ; B|}aKX , X)⟩
of an initiator run of the protocol with some X ∈ Princ. As B freshly generated both N∗1 and N2, but N2 in a responder
run, B’s honesty guarantees that N∗1 ≠ N2. Hence,M = {|N∗1 ; B|}aKX ∈ S-Sec .
(2.2) If αB(e) = send({|N∗1 ;N∗2 ; B|}aKX , X), it must be in a prefix
⟨rec({|N∗1 ; X |}aKB).fresh(N∗2 ).send({|N∗1 ;N∗2 ; B|}aKX , X)⟩
of a responder run of the protocol with some X ∈ Princ. If N∗2 = N2, since µ, ξ  @B[fresh(N2) ∧ F send
({|N1;N2; B|}aKA , A)], it follows from B’s honesty that also N∗1 = N1 and X = A. Clearly, M = {|N1;N2; B|}aKA ∈ S-Sec . In
contrast, if N∗2 ≠ N2 then, as B first received {|N∗1 ; X |}aKB , the axioms (P3), (C2), (C1), (P1) together with the induction
hypothesis guarantee that N∗1 ≠ N2. Thus, again,M = {|N∗1 ;N∗2 ; A|}aKX ∈ S-Sec .
(2.3) If αB(e) = send({|N∗2 |}aKX , X), it must be in a complete initiator run
⟨fresh(N∗1 ).send({|N∗1 ; B|}aKX , X).rec({|N∗1 ;N∗2 ; X |}aKB).send({|N∗2 |}aKX , X)⟩
of the protocol with some X ∈ Princ. Note that, N∗2 = N2 is impossible, as B would first receive {|N∗1 ;N2; X |}aKB from
the channel, and axioms (P3), (C2), (C1), (P1) together with the induction hypothesis would yield a contradiction.
Therefore, N∗2 ≠ N2, andM = {|N∗2 |}aKX ∈ S-Sec .
Thus, (iv) never holds, (iii) always holds, and the statement follows. 
Note that an analogue of this lemma fails for the original NSPK protocol. The proof fails at case (1.3) because the message
{|N1;N2|}aKA can be understood by A as belonging to a run executed with an agent different from B, namely the intruder, as
we saw in the previous countermodel.
Our second lemma allows us to conclude that if A = Z is the initiator, then it will never be able to trick an honest
principal into sending the message {|N2|}aKB to B in another run of the protocol. Namely, the lemma shows that if B is playing
the responder in another protocol run initiated by an honest agent, then it will not mix the relevant data of the two runs.
Lemma 4.4. Let B ∈ Hon, µ be a NSL model, and ξ a global state such that
µ, ξ  @B[fresh(N2) ∧ F send({|N1;N2; B|}aKZ , Z)],
and let also C ∈ Hon, and ξ ′ a global state such that
µ, ξ ′  @C [fresh(N∗1 ) ∧ F send({|N∗1 ; C |}aKB , B)].
For every global state ξ ′′ ⊇ ξ ′, every D, E, F ∈ Princ with F /∈ {C, B}, and every message M ′ which is not {N∗1 , K−1B , K−1C }-secure,
or M ′ contains {|N∗1 ;N2; B|}aKC , or {|N∗1 ; X |}aKY with X ≠ C or Y ≠ B, or {|N;N∗1 ; X |}aKY with any N, X, Y , the following holds:
µ, ξ ′′ ̸ @Ch[in(D,M ′, E)] and µ, ξ ′′ ̸ @F [knows(M ′)].
Proof. We reuse Lemma 4.1, now with G = {B, C} and S = {N∗1 , K−1B , K−1C } ∪ {M ′ | M ′ contains{|N∗1 ;N2; B|}aKC , or {|N∗1 ; X |}aKY
with X ≠ C or Y ≠ B, or {|N;N∗1 ; X |}aKY for any N, X, Y }. The proof that S is a rational set and that conditions (i) and (ii) of
Lemma 4.1 hold at ξ ′ is similar to that of Lemma 4.3. Therefore, Lemma 4.1 tells us that for every global state ξ ′′ ⊇ ξ ′ of µ
either condition (iii) or condition (iv) of Lemma 4.1 must hold.
We proceed to show that condition (iv) cannot hold. Concretely, we prove by global induction on ξ ′′ ⊇ ξ ′ that
condition (iii) of Lemma 4.1 holds for ξ ′′ and condition (iv) of Lemma 4.1 does not hold. The base case with ξ ′′ = ξ ′ is
immediate. For the induction step, let us assume that ξ ′′∪{e} ⊃ ξ ′′ ⊇ ξ ′ are global states and that, by induction hypothesis,
(iii) holds for ξ ′′ and (iv) does not. Since, by Lemma 4.1, we know that (iii) or (iv) must hold, it suffices to show that (iv)
cannot hold for ξ ′′ ∪ {e}. We must then consider, in turn, the two relevant cases for condition (iv) to hold, that is, e ∈ EvB
and e ∈ EvC .
Case (1): If e ∈ EvB, we analyze the possible sending actions αB(e).
(1.1) If αB(e) = send({|N◦1 ; B|}aKX , X), it must be in a prefix
⟨fresh(N◦1 ).send({|N◦1 ; B|}aKX , X)⟩
of an initiator run of the protocol with some X ∈ Princ. As B freshly generated N◦1 , and C freshly generated N∗1 , the
freshness axioms (F1-2) guarantee that N◦1 ≠ N∗1 . Thus, the messageM ′ = {|N◦1 ; B|}aKX is in S-Sec .
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(1.2) If αB(e) = send({|N◦1 ;N◦2 ; B|}aKX , X), it must be in a prefix
⟨rec({|N◦1 ; X |}aKB).fresh(N◦2 ).send({|N◦1 ;N◦2 ; B|}aKX , X)⟩
of a responder run of the protocol with some X ∈ Princ. As B freshly generated N◦2 , and C freshly generated N∗1 ,
the freshness axioms (F1-2) guarantee that N◦2 ≠ N∗1 . Moreover, as B first receives {|N◦1 ; X |}aKB , axioms (P3), (C2),
(C1), (P1) together with the induction hypothesis guarantee that either N◦1 ≠ N∗1 , or N◦1 = N∗1 and X = C . In the
former case, it is immediate that M ′ = {|N◦1 ;N◦2 ; B|}aKX is S-secure. In the latter case, N◦2 = N2 is impossible, because
µ, ξ  @B[fresh(N2) ∧ F send({|N1;N2; B|}aKZ , Z)] and B’s honesty would necessitate N◦1 = N1 and X = Z , which
contradicts C ’s honesty. Therefore, N◦2 ≠ N2 and the messageM ′ = {|N∗1 ;N◦2 ; B|}aKC is S-secure.
(1.3) If αB(e) = send({|N◦2 |}aKX , X), it must be in a complete initiator run
⟨fresh(N◦1 ).send({|N◦1 ; B|}aKX , X).rec({|N◦1 ;N◦2 ; X |}aKB).send({|N◦2 |}aKX , X)⟩
of the protocol with some X ∈ Princ . As Bwill first receive {|N◦1 ;N◦2 ; X |}aKB , axioms (P3), (C2), (C1) and (P1) along with
the induction hypothesis guarantee that N◦2 ≠ N∗1 . Thus, the messageM ′ = {|N◦2 |}aKX is S-secure.
Case (2): If e ∈ EvC , we also analyze the relevant sending actions αC (e).
(2.1) If αC (e) = send({|N◦1 ; C |}aKX , X), it must be in a prefix
⟨fresh(N◦1 ).send({|N◦1 ; C |}aKX , X)⟩.
If N◦1 ≠ N∗1 thenM ′ = {|N◦1 ; C |}aKX is S-secure. In contrast, if N◦1 = N∗1 , as µ, ξ ′  @C [fresh(N∗1 ) ∧ F send({|N∗1 ; C |}aKB , B)]
it follows from C ’s honesty that also X = B, and the messageM ′ = {|N∗1 ; C |}aKB is S-secure.
(2.2) If αC (e) = send({|N◦1 ;N◦2 ; C |}aKX , X), it must be in a prefix
⟨rec({|N◦1 , X |}aKC ).fresh(N◦2 ).send({|N◦1 ;N◦2 ; C |}aKX , X)⟩
of a responder run of the protocol with some X ∈ Princ. As C freshly generatesN∗1 andN◦2 , butN∗1 in an initiator run, C ’s
honesty ensures thatN◦2 ≠ N∗1 . Moreover, since C first received {|N◦1 ; X |}aKC from the channel, the axioms (P3), (C2), (C1)
and (P1) along with the induction hypothesis guarantee that N◦1 ≠ N∗1 . Therefore, the messageM ′ = {|N◦1 ;N◦2 ; C |}aKX is
S-secure.
(2.3) If αC (e) = send({|N◦2 |}aKX , X), it must be in a complete initiator run
⟨fresh(N◦1 ).send({|N◦1 ; C |}aKX , X).rec({|N◦1 ;N◦2 ; X |}aKC ).send({|N◦2 |}aKX , X)⟩
of the protocol with some X ∈ Princ. The proof is similar to step (1.3) above.
Thus, (iv) never holds, (iii) always holds, and the statement follows. 
Wenowproceed to themain result: the responder authenticates the initiator. Recall fromSection 3.3 that given an honest
principal B, authResp,Init,3B,A (A, B,N1,N2) corresponds to
@B[roleRespB (A, B,N1,N2)] ⇒ @A[P◦ send({|N2|}aKB , B)],
where roleRespB (A, B,N1,N2) is
rec({|N2|}aKB) ∧ P(send({|N1;N2; B|}aKA , A) ∧ P(fresh(N2) ∧ P rec({|N1; A|}aKB))).
Proposition 4.5. NSL  authResp,Init,3B,A (A, B,N1,N2) for A ∈ Princ, B ∈ Hon, and N1 and N2 arbitrary distinct nonces.
Proof. Let µ be an NSL model, ξ a global state such that µ, ξ  @B[roleRespB (A, B,N1,N2)]. Recall that B is honest. We have
two cases: either (1) A is also honest or (2) A is actually Z .
Case (1): Assume, by absurdity, that µ, ξ ̸ @A[P◦ send({|N2|}aKB , B)]. Since both A and B are honest, we can consider ξ ′,
where ξ ′ ⊆ ξ and µ, ξ ′  @B[fresh(N2)], and use Lemma 4.3 to conclude that µ, ξ ̸ @Ch[P◦C∈Princ in(C, {|N2|}aKB , B)].
However, given axioms (P3) and (C2), this contradicts the assumption that µ, ξ  @B[roleRespB (A, B,N1,N2)], as in particular
it must be the case that µ, ξ ̸ @B[rec({|N2|}aKB)]. Hence µ, ξ  @A[P◦ send({|N2|}aKB , B)].
Case (2): If A = Z then B’s run is actually
⟨rec({|N1; Z |}aKB).fresh(N2).send({|N1;N2; B|}aKZ , Z).rec({|N2|}aKB)⟩.
We must show that µ, ξ  @Z [P◦ send({|N2|}aKB , B)]. From axioms (P3) and (C1-2), we know that µ, ξ 

C∈Princ
@C [P◦ send({|N2|}aKB , B)]. Hence, it suffices to prove that Z cannot trick an honest principal C into sending themessage {|N2|}aKB
to B. We can exclude the case when C = B, since in protocol models no honest principal sends messages to himself. Now,
an honest C ≠ Bwill only send such a message in an initiator role of the form
⟨fresh(N∗1 ).send({|N∗1 ; C |}aKB , B).rec({|N∗1 ;N2; B|}aKC ).send({|N2|}aKB , B)⟩.
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But clearly only B himself, or Z , would send {|N∗1 ;N2; B|}aKC . Moreover, B can be excluded because his honesty guarantees
that he will not use N2 but rather a fresh value, according to the definition of protocol models or else it must be the
case that N∗1 = N1 and C = Z , which contradicts the honesty of C . Moreover, if for any ξ ′ ⊆ ξ we have indeed that
µ, ξ ′  @C [fresh(N∗1 ) ∧ F send({|N∗1 ; C |}aKB , B)], then Lemma 4.4 guarantees that µ, ξ ̸ @Z [knows({|N∗1 ;N2; B|}aKC )], and
therefore C would never receive {|N∗1 ;N2; B|}aKC and thus could not complete the run. We can therefore conclude that
µ, ξ  @Z [P◦ send({|N2|}aKB , B)]. 
As NSPK and NSL are well studied, our results are not surprising and the proof ideas are similar to those found, e.g.,
in [55]. However, our development illustrates well how we can use our channel model to give semantic proofs and how we
can exploit metatheoretic properties, all within DTL. Other security protocols can be falsified or verified similarly, using DTL
as an object logic. We now turn to the main strength of DTL: its use as a metalogic to relate different models for security
protocols and to prove further metatheorems about the models themselves.
5. Meta-level model analysis
In this section, we present two concrete examples of metareasoning. First, we prove the equivalence of two models for
guaranteeing message-origin authentication. Second, we relate channel-based and intruder-centric models, showing that it
is sufficient to consider models with a single intruder who controls the network.
5.1. Message-origin authentication
The following example is of a different nature than the last one. We now show how DTL can be used to relate models
at different levels of abstraction. Establishing such formal relationships is a central paradigm in Information Security and
is used, for example, when carrying out simulation proofs to show that concrete cryptographic operations implement a
given ideal functionality. Our example is centered aroundmessage-origin authentication: ensuring that a message purported
to come from an agent really originated with the agent. We will use DTL to study the relationship between two models
designed to guarantee message-origin authentication.
1. An abstract model TTP where principals may use a special ‘‘logged’’ channel T controlled by a trusted third party. This
channel logs all incoming messages and issues evidence of their origin to the recipients.
2. A concrete model DS that is closer to a possible realization of an authentic channel. Communication takes place in DS
over a public channel, but principals digitally sign the messages they send so that their signatures can be verified by the
recipients.
We investigate several relationships between these twomodels by exploring transformations of their corresponding DTL
models, along with translations of their properties. By abstracting away details of the communication media, we prove that
the two models are equivalent under mild assumptions about the nature of message-origin authentication.
5.1.1. TTP: trusted third party logging
In this model, we extend the channel-based model CB of Section 3 with an additional communication medium T ,
representing the logged channel and controlled by a trusted third party. Principals can choose to send or receive messages
either through the public channel or T . Messages exchanged through T are logged by the trusted third party, who issues
evidence of their origin to the recipients. Hence, all principals are augmented with actions for communicating using T and
with state propositions that provide evidence of origin for the messages received from T .
Recall that we consider fixed a network signature ⟨Princ,Num⟩. The signatureΣTTP = ⟨Princ ⊎ {Ch, T }, Act, Prop⟩ is such
that for each A ∈ Princ we have that
• ActA is composed of
– send(M, B), rec(M), spy(M), and fresh(X), as inΣCB,
– sendT (M, B): sending messageM to B via T ,
– recT (B,M): receiving from T messageM originating from B,
– spyT (B,M): eavesdropping in T messageM originating from B;• PropA includes the state propositions
– knows(M), as inΣCB,
– evid(B,M): evidence was obtained from T that messageM originates from B;
and for Ch, as inΣCB, and also for T , we have
• ActCh = ActT , where both consist of the actions in(A,M, B), out(A,M, B), and leak;
• PropCh = PropT = ∅.
We useLTTP to denote the DTL language over the signatureΣTTP.
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The axiomatization of TTP includes the axioms (F1–F2), (C1–C4), and (P1–P6) of CB, from Section 3. It also includes
corresponding versions of the channel axioms for T , namely
(T1) @T [in(A,M, B)≫A sendT (M, B)]
(T2) @T [out(A,M, B)⇒ P in(A,M, B)]
(T3) @T [out(A,M, B)≫B recT (A,M)]
(T4) @T [leak⇒ (B∈Princ c⃝B[⊤])]
and axioms for the interaction of each principal A ∈ Princ with T , that is
(PT1) @A[sendT (M, B)⇒ Y(knows(M) ∧ knows(B))]
(PT2) @A[sendT (M, B)≫T in(A,M, B)]
(PT3) @A[recT (B,M)≫T out(B,M, A)]
(PT4) @A[spyT (B,M)≫T (leak ∧ P(

C∈Princ in(B,M, C)))]
(PT6) @A[fresh(X)⇒¬ c⃝T [⊤]].
An additional axiom is needed to define the state propositions representing evidence for each principal A ∈ Princ , namely
(E) @A[evid(B,M)⇔ P◦ recT (B,M)].
TTPmodels µ are those interpretation structures overΣTTP that satisfy the above axioms and the following clause (KT),
which replaces (K) of the CBmodel. For each A ∈ Princ ,M ∈ Msg , and non-empty local state ξA,
(KT) µ, ξA A knows(M) iffM ∈ close({M ′ | µ, ξA A (Y knows(M ′))∨rec(M ′)∨spy(M ′)∨fresh(M ′)∨(B∈Princ recT (B,M ′)∨
spyT (B,M ′))}) .
Clearly, (K1–K7) also follow from KT, as well as the following properties:
@A[recT (B,M)⇒ knows(M)] (KT5)
@A[spyT (B,M)⇒ knows(M)] (KT6)
We also strengthen the honesty requirement. Besides axiom (Hon), we require for every A ∈ Hon:
(HonT) @A[¬ spyT (B,M)], for every B ∈ Princ and messageM .
In TTP, we can prove that the state propositions that provide each principal evidence of origin of themessages he received
via T are actually correct.
Proposition 5.1. TTP  @A[evid(B,M)] ⇒ @B[P◦ sendT (M, A)] for A, B ∈ Princ and M ∈ Msg.
Proof. Follows easily from axioms (E), (PT3), (T2), and (T1). 
5.1.2. Digital signatures
The DSmodel specializes the channel-based model CB of Section 3. We require that every principal A possesses a secret,
special-purpose asymmetric key K−1A , subject to the key axioms (aKey1–aKey2). We assume that these keys are new,
i.e., {KA | A ∈ Princ} ∩ Num = ∅, and that the network signature ⟨Princ,Num⟩ is augmented to ⟨Princ,Num+⟩, with
Num+ = Nonces ⊎ SymK ⊎ PubK+ where PubK+ = PubK ⊎ {KA | A ∈ Princ}. We writeMsg+ to denote the set of messages
in the augmented signature, in contrast to Msg , the messages in the original signature. For the purpose of message-origin
authentication, we specify that a principal A should indicate the origin of a message M by sending it along with A’s name
and a signature, that is, A sendsM; A; {|M|}a
K−1A
. By using the associated public key KA, the message’s receiver can then verify
the signature to determine whetherM originates from A.
We defineΣDS to be identical toΣCB, except defined over the augmented network signature. We letLDS denote the DTL
language over the signature ΣDS. To guarantee the desired behavior, we require that each honest principal A only uses his
private key for signingmessages where signatures or their associated public/private keys do not occur. Similarly, we require
that A never receives messages that use the special-purpose public/private keys, unless they are properly signed. Namely,
we require
(NS) @A[¬ send(M ′, B)] ifM ′ ∈ Msg+ \Msg andM ′ ≠ M; A; {|M|}aK−1A for someM ∈ Msg ,
(NR) @A[¬ rec(M ′)] ifM ′ ∈ Msg+ \Msg andM ′ ≠ M; B; {|M|}aK−1B for someM ∈ Msg and B ∈ Princ.
Note that A ∈ Honwill never disclose his special-purpose private key K−1A or forwardmessages signed by other principals
using the special-purpose keys. As above, we assume for simplicity that principals know each other’s names (N) and public
keys (PK), and that honest principals do not spy (Hon). The DS models are the interpretation structures that satisfy these
axioms along with the CB requirements.
4026 D. Basin et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 412 (2011) 4007–4043
Fig. 6. Comparing a TTPmodel and a DSmodel.
5.1.3. Comparing the models
The TTP model is more abstract than the DS model in that it provides a higher-level message-origin authentication
mechanism without using cryptography. Still, we would like that the two models provide message-origin authentication
mechanisms with comparable behavior, as depicted in Fig. 6, where the triple arrow indicates that evid(A,M) holds from
that point on.
It is clear that we must use the more abstract language of the TTP and provide a translation to the language of the DS
model. Given a formula γ ∈ LTTP, let γ ∈ LDS be the formula obtained from γ by uniformly replacing each occurrence of
• T with Ch,
• sendT (M, B) local to principal Awith send(M; A; {|M|}aK−1A , B),• recT (B,M)with rec(M; B; {|M|}aK−1B ),• spyT (B,M)with spy(M; B; {|M|}aK−1B ),• evid(B,M)with P◦ rec(M; B; {|M|}aK−1B ),• in(A,M, B) local to T with in(A,M; A; {|M|}a
K−1A
, B),
• out(A,M, B) local to T with out(A,M; A; {|M|}a
K−1A
, B).
We would like to prove that TTP and DS are equivalent in the sense that TTP  γ iff DS  γ . One way to establish such
an equivalence is to define model transformations β : TTPΞ → DSΞ and θ : DSΞ → TTPΞ such that, for every γ ∈ LTTP,
⟨µTTP, ξTTP⟩ ∈ TTPΞ , and ⟨µDS, ξDS⟩ ∈ DSΞ :
(i) µTTP, ξTTP  γ if and only if β(µTTP, ξTTP)  γ , and
(ii) θ(µDS, ξDS)  γ if and only if µDS, ξDS  γ .
Observe that the composition of the two model transformations β and θ need not be the identity, but only preserve logical
equivalence forLTTP modulo translation of formulas to the language of the DSmodel.
There are two subtle issues here. First, themodel transformations, associated to β and guided by the syntactic translation
defined above, must merge Ch and T together, since there is only one communication medium in DS.4 Hence, one cannot
expect property (i) to hold in general when γ involves temporal formulas local to either the public or the logged channel.
This is, however, aminor restriction, as we should still be able to prove (i) for all relevant properties concerning the behavior
of the principals.
The second issue concerns property (ii): the transformation θ must be able to represent in TTP all behaviors allowed inDS
models. The problem is that there is a minor incompatibility between the models related to the use of the special-purpose
keys in DS. The axioms (NS) and (NR) require that honest agents use signatures appropriately in their realization of a trusted
channel. However, a priori, it does not seem reasonable to similarly restrict the intruder. Still, it is clear that Z gains nothing
from sending messages that no other principal is willing to receive. Hence, as a consequence of axiom (EZ1), we have the
following property:
(NSZ) @Z [¬ send(M ′, A)] ifM ′ ∈ Msg+ \Msg andM ′ ≠ M; B; {|M|}aK−1B for someM ∈ Msg and B ∈ Princ.
4 We will refrain here from working out the details of this model transformation since we will do this in detail shortly in a slightly different, but
compatible, context.
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Fig. 7. Z interferes withmessage-origin authentication in the DSmodel.
(NSZ) is weaker than the axiom (NS) for the honest principals. As a consequence, Z can still prevent message-origin
authentication in the DS model, which we established for the TTP model in Proposition 5.1. The reason is that in the TTP
model, T not only issues evidence of message origin but it also provides a stronger form of correspondence, in that the
intended recipient indeed receives the signed message. However, this cannot be guaranteed in the DSmodel since nothing
prevents Z from spying a messageM; A; {|M|}a
K−1A
sent by a principal A to a principal B, and then forwarding it to some other
principal C . Clearly, when receiving it, C will have evidence of the message’s origin but cannot be sure that A really sent
the message to him. This situation, which is illustrated in Fig. 7, cannot be mimicked in the TTPmodel. Thus, there are two
options for establishing the desired equivalence:
1. Relax the TTPmodel to allow the intruder to divert messages from T and forward them to different destinations.
2. Change the way messages are signed in the DSmodel to guarantee the required form of correspondence.
Although the second option is more appropriate (as discussed in [51]), both options have advantages and disadvantages,
which we discuss below.
Option 1. We can solve the above mismatch by changing the TTP model to allow the situation described in Fig. 7. Namely,
we consider a slightly different model TTP′ where the intruder can divert each message sent to the logged channel T to a
different recipient. To formalize this, we extend the TTP signature with an additional action dvtT for each principal and we
change or add new axioms to specify its properties. The signatureΣTTP′ = ⟨Princ ⊎ {Ch, T }, Act, Prop⟩ is such that for each
A ∈ Princ , we have that
• ActA is composed of
– send(M, B), rec(M), spy(M), fresh(X), sendT (M, B), recT (B,M), and spyT (B,M), as inΣTTP, and
– dvtT (B,M, C): divert to principal C the messageM originating from B;
• PropA includes, as inΣTTP, the state propositions knows(M) and evid(B,M);
and for Ch and T , as inΣTTP, we have that
• ActCh = ActT includes the actions in(A,M, B), out(A,M, B), and leak;
• PropCh = PropT = ∅.
WeuseLTTP′ to denote theDTL language over the extended signatureΣTTP′ .We specify the newdivert actions by replacing
axiom (T1)with
(T1’) @T [in(B,M, C)⇒ ( c⃝B[sendT (M, C)] ∨ (

A∈Princ c⃝A[dvtT (B,M, C)]))]
and adding additional axioms for each principal A, namely:
(PT7) @A[dvtT (B,M, C)⇒ P spyT (B,M)]
(PT8) @A[dvtT (B,M, C)≫T in(B,M, C)].
Note that as a consequence of axioms (HonT) and (PT7), honest principals are also not allowed to divert messages. The
TTP′ models are then the interpretation structures over ΣTTP′ satisfying (F1 − F2), (C1 − C4), (P1 − P6), (T1’), (T2 − T4),
(PT1− PT4), (PT6− PT8), (E), (N), and (KT). In this setting, we can no longer interpret message-origin authentication as we
did in TTP and Proposition 5.1 is weakened as follows.
Proposition 5.2. TTP′  @A[evid(B,M)] ⇒ @B[P◦(C∈Princ sendT (M, C))] for A, B ∈ Princ and M ∈ Msg.
Proof. This follows from the definition of satisfaction, using the axioms (E), (PT3), (T2), (T1’), (PT7), and (PT4) and the fact
that interpretation structures are bounded to the past. 
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The models TTP ′ and DS can now be shown to be equivalent, in the precise sense described above, where we extend the
translation of formulas γ ∈ LTTP ′ to γ ∈ LDS by additionally replacing each occurrence of
• dvtT (B,M, C)with send(M; B; {|M|}aK−1B , C).
Proposition 5.3. For every γ ∈ L̸ c⃝TTP′ built from formulas private to principals, TTP′  γ if and only if DS  γ .
We omit the proof as it is technically very similar to the upcoming proof of the corresponding property that we give for
the second option. As a corollary, we have that the model DS based on digital signatures fulfills a form of message-origin
authentication similar to the one stated in Proposition 5.2 for TTP′, where evidence that a message M originated in B is
provided to a principal A by the past reception ofM; B; {|M|}a
K−1B
.
Corollary 5.4. DS  @A[P◦ rec(M; B; {|M|}aK−1B )] ⇒ @B[P◦(

C∈Princ send(M; B; {|M|}aK−1B , C))] for A, B ∈ Princ and M ∈ Msg.
Option 2. In this option, we keep the initial formulation of the TTPmodel, as well as the original meaning of message-origin
authentication, but add more structure to the digitally signed messages in the concrete model. We letΣDS♯ = ΣDS, but we
will still useLDS♯ to denote the corresponding DTL language. We change DS
♯ by requiring that a principal Amust now send
a message M whose message-origin authentication is required by the recipient B by including the name B as part of the
signed message, that is, A sends M; A; {|B;M|}a
K−1A
(cf. [51]). In addition, axioms (NS) and (NR) must be rewritten, for every
honest A, to:
(NS♯) @A[¬ send(M ′, B)], ifM ′ ∈ Msg+ \Msg andM ′ ≠ M; A; {|B;M|}aK−1A for someM ∈ Msg and B ∈ Princ
(NR♯) @A[¬ rec(M ′)], ifM ′ ∈ Msg+ \Msg andM ′ ≠ M; B; {|A;M|}aK−1B for someM ∈ Msg and B ∈ Princ
Using axiom (EZ1), we also obtain a variant of the (NSZ) property, namely
(NS♯Z) @Z [¬ send(M ′, A)], ifM ′ ∈ Msg+ \Msg andM ′ ≠ M; B; {|A;M|}aK−1B for someM ∈ Msg and B ∈ Princ.
Finally, we redefine the translation between the languages of the two models. Given γ ∈ LTTP, let γ ♯ ∈ LDS♯ be the
formula obtained from γ by uniformly replacing each occurrence of
• T with Ch,
• sendT (M, B) local to principal Awith send(M; A; {|B;M|}aK−1A , B),• recT (B,M) local to principal Awith rec(M; B; {|A;M|}aK−1B ),• spyT (B,M)with

C∈Princ spy(M; B; {|C;M|}aK−1B ),• in(A,M, B) local to T with in(A,M; A; {|B;M|}a
K−1A
, B),
• out(A,M, B) local to T with out(A,M; A; {|B;M|}a
K−1A
, B).
The models TTP and DS♯ can now be shown to be equivalent, as illustrated in Fig. 8.
Proposition 5.5. For every γ ∈ L̸ c⃝TTP built from formulas private to principals, TTP  γ if and only if DS♯  γ ♯.
Proof. Let β : TTPΞ → DS♯Ξ be defined, for each pair ⟨µTTP, ξ⟩ ∈ TTPΞ with µTTP = ⟨λ, α, π⟩, by β(µTTP, ξ) =⟨⟨λ♯, α♯, π ♯⟩, ξ⟩where
• λ♯A = λA for every A ∈ Princ and λ♯Ch = ⟨Ev♯Ch,≤♯Ch⟩, with Ev♯Ch = EvCh ∪ EvT and ≤♯Ch the restriction to Ev♯Ch of any
linearization of≤ compatible with the global state ξ ;
• α♯A(e) =

αA(e) if αA(e) is an A-action inΣDS♯
send(M; A; {|B;M|}a
K−1A
, B) if αA(e) = sendT (M, B)
rec(M; B; {|A;M|}a
K−1B
) if αA(e) = recT (B,M)
spy(M; B; {|C;M|}a
K−1B
) if αA(e) = spyT (B,M) and
αT (e′) = in(B,M, C), for some e′ <T e
α
♯
Ch(e) =

αCh(e) if e ∈ EvCh
in(A,M; A; {|B;M|}a
K−1A
, B) if e ∈ EvT and αT (e) = in(A,M, B)
out(A,M; A; {|B;M|}a
K−1A
, B) if e ∈ EvT and αT (e) = out(A,M, B)
leak if e ∈ EvT and αT (e) = leak
• π ♯A(∅) = {knows(M ′) | M ′ ∈ close({M | knows(M) ∈ πA(∅)} ∪ {KB | B ∈ Princ} ∪ {K−1A })}, whereas π ♯Ch is always empty.
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Fig. 8.Model transformations between TTP and DS♯ models.
Note that when αA(e) = spyT (B,M), we assume fixed a consistent choice of principal C such that α♯A(e) = spy
(M; B; {|C;M|}a
K−1B
), as guaranteed by axiom (PT4). In addition, as in all other cases,when seen as a formula,α
♯
A(e) corresponds
to αA(e)
♯
. Note also that α♯Ch is well defined since EvCh ∩ EvT = ∅. Moreover, knows(M) ∈ π ♯A(∅) iff knows(M) ∈ πA(∅)
for every M ∈ Msg . Whenever one defines a model transformation such as this one, one must guarantee that indeed
⟨λ♯, α♯, π ♯⟩ ∈ DS♯. It is straightforward, though tedious, to check that all the necessary conditions are satisfied by the
interpretation structure. For instance, note that axiom (NS’) holds by construction as the only sending actions of an honest
principal A are either normal channel-sending actions like send(M, B) with M ∈ Msg , or else they come from actions like
sendT (M, B) where again M ∈ Msg and they are transformed into M; A; {|B;M|}aK−1A . Another axiom, such as (C1), holds in
DS♯ as a consequence of (C1) and (T1) holding in any TTPmodel. Observe, moreover that, by construction, ξ is still a global
state of ⟨λ♯, α♯, π ♯⟩.
We must prove that µTTP, ξ  γ iff β(µTTP, ξ)  γ ♯, for every γ ∈ L̸ c⃝TTP built from formulas private to principals. As any
such γ must be a Boolean combination of private formulas of different principals, it suffices to show thatµTTP, ξ  @A[ϕ] iff
β(µTTP, ξ)  @A[ϕ]♯, for every A ∈ Princ and ϕ ∈ L̸ c⃝A . The result follows by a trivial adaptation of Lemma 2.2, once we note
that the translation of formulas matches the relabeling of the events introduced by β (and θ ), and that π and π ♯ agree for
messages inMsg .
Conversely, given a DS♯ model µDS♯ = ⟨λ♯, α♯, π ♯⟩, we must be able to identify the channel events that correspond, in a
TTPmodel, to the trusted third party T . Of course, these are precisely the eventswhose label is somehow related to amessage
that uses the special-purpose signatures. Below, we will call e ∈ Ev♯Ch a T -event if one of the following conditions holds:
• α♯Ch(e) = in(A,M, B) or α♯Ch(e) = out(A,M, B), for some A, B ∈ Princ and someM ∈ Msg+ \Msg; or
• α♯Ch(e) = leak, and e ∈ Ev♯Z with α♯Z (e) = spy(M), for someM ∈ Msg+ \Msg .
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Note that, as a consequence of conditions (NS♯), (NR♯), and (NS♯Z), all the relevant messagesM ∈ Msg+ \Msg appearing
in the labels of the events above must be of the formM ′; C; {|D;M ′|}a
K−1C
for some C,D ∈ Princ andM ′ ∈ Msg . Furthermore,
in the context above, condition (EZ2) also ensures that A = C and B = D. We now let θ : DS♯Ξ → TTPΞ be defined for each
pair ⟨µDS♯ , ξ⟩ ∈ DS♯Ξ by θ(µDS♯ , ξ) = ⟨⟨λ, α, π⟩, ξ⟩where
• λA = λ♯A for every A ∈ Princ , λCh = ⟨EvCh,≤Ch⟩, and λT = ⟨EvT ,≤T ⟩, where EvT = {e ∈ Ev♯Ch | e is a T -event},
EvCh = Ev♯Ch \ EvT , and≤Ch and≤T are the corresponding restrictions of≤♯Ch;
• αA(e) =

α
♯
A(e) if α
♯
A(e) does not involve a message inMsg
+ \Msg
sendT (B,M) if α
♯
A(e) = send(M; A; {|B;M|}aK−1A , B)
recT (B,M) if α
♯
A(e) = rec(M; B; {|A;M|}aK−1B )
spyT (B,M) if α
♯
A(e) = spy(M; B; {|C;M|}aK−1B ),
αCh(e) = α♯Ch(e) for e ∈ EvCh, and
αT (e) =

in(A,M, B) if α♯Ch(e) = in(A,M; A; {|B;M|}aK−1A , B)
out(A,M, B) if α♯A(e) = out(A,M; A; {|B;M|}aK−1A , B)
leak if α♯A(e) = leak;
• πA(∅) = {knows(M) | M ∈ π ♯A(∅) ∩Msg}, and πCh and πT are both always empty.
It is tedious although not difficult to prove that ⟨λ, α, π⟩ ∈ TTP and that ξ is still a global state. Moreover, by construction,
we have that β and θ are almost inverses of each other, in the sense that ⟨µDS♯ , ξ⟩ and β(θ(µDS♯ , ξ))may differ only in the
choice of a linearization compatible with ξ in the construction of the latter that is different from the linearization implicit
in the former. Still, the two models are similar enough to satisfy the preconditions of Lemma 2.2, again, with respect to
all formulas γ ∈ L̸ c⃝TTP built from formulas private to principals. As a consequence, we also obtain that µDS♯ , ξ  γ ♯ iff
β(θ(µDS♯ , ξ))  γ
♯ iff θ(µDS♯ , ξ)  γ .
Finally, we can establish the equivalence of the two models. If TTP  γ and ⟨µDS♯ , ξ⟩ ∈ DS♯Ξ then θ(µDS♯ , ξ) ∈ TTPΞ
and thus θ(µDS♯ , ξ)  γ . Hence, µDS♯ , ξ  γ
♯ and thus DS♯  γ ♯. Conversely, if DS♯  γ ♯ and ⟨µTTP, ξ⟩ ∈ TTPΞ then
β(µTTP, ξ) ∈ DS♯Ξ and so β(µTTP, ξ)  γ ♯. Hence, µTTP, ξ  γ and thus TTP  γ . 
Fig. 8 depicts the essential ingredients of the proof of Proposition 5.5 and it closely follows the translation of syntax. Note
that the upper and lower diagrams depict two DS♯ models that differ only in the linearization of the Ch and T events of the
diagram in themiddle. Note further that β transforms themiddle diagram alongwith the global state ξ , but the linearization
considered would not be compatible with the global state ξ ′ also depicted.
As a corollary of Proposition 5.5, we have thatDS♯ fulfills themessage-origin authentication requirement originally stated
for TTP in Proposition 5.2.
Corollary 5.6. DS♯  @A[P◦ rec(M; B; {|A;M|}aK−1B )] ⇒ @B[P◦ send(M; B; {|A;M|}
a
K−1B
, A)] for A, B ∈ Princ and M ∈ Msg.
5.2. Channel-based versus intruder-centric models
We now show that, from the perspective of protocol analysis, the channel-based models we have been using are
equivalent to the kinds of intruder-centric models used in many protocol analysis tools [3,12,59,65]. In intruder-centric
models, the intruder controls, and is identified with, the network. Moreover, it is even possible to eliminate the honest
agents. This avoids the complications of distribution as intruder-centric models correspond to linear models of the network
behavior.
Specifically, we will establish a notion called attack equivalence between models, which says that attacks are neither lost
nor gained by moving between models, where an attack is a countermodel to a security property. In this paper, we restrict
our focus to secrecy and authentication properties as described in Section 3.4.
We will proceed in three phases. In the first phase, we translate our CBmodels to models where the intruder is merged
with the channel, which we call ZB models. Hence, ZB models no longer have a channel and messages sent go directly to
the intruder. In the second phase, which we call step compression, we reorganize the ZB models so that the actions of each
principal corresponding to the execution of certain protocol steps appear as consecutive events in local life-cycles. We call
these CZBmodels, standing for compressed ZBmodels. In the third and final phase,wedrop any explicit reference to the honest
principals in CZBmodels, keeping just the intruder. This requires changing the granularity of the actions. These are no longer
the atomic actions of sending and receiving messages or generating fresh data, but rather transactions corresponding to the
execution of complete steps of some fixed protocol by some agent. We call the resulting intruder-centric models ZC models.
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Below, we introduce all the models and show their attack equivalence by proving properties of the proposed model
transformations. Before doing so, we take a closer look at protocols and how we model them. Recall from Section 3 that an
Alice-and-Bob-style protocol description corresponds to a sequence of message exchanges
(msg1) s1 → r1 : (f1,1, . . . , f1,t1). M1
...
(msgq) sq → rq : (fq,1, . . . , fq,tq). Mq
(msgq+1) sq+1 → rq+1 : (fq+1,1, . . . , fq+1,tq+1). Mq+1
...
(msgm) sm → rm : (fm,1, . . . , fm,tm). Mm
where each si, ri ∈ {a1, . . . , aj} identifies the principal playing one of the j protocol roles. We assume, as is standard and
without loss of generality, that sj+1 = rj, for 1 ≤ j < m.
Whereas we previously considered the protocol run corresponding to each principal given a specific protocol
instantiation, we now split the runs in smaller steps. Specifically, consider two consecutive lines of the protocol description,
e.g., those labeled msgq and msgq+1. Then there is a sequence of actions that the principal instantiating rq = sq+1 must
execute. Namely, he must receiveMq, freshly generate fq+1,1, . . . , fq+1,tq+1 , and finally sendMq+1. In general, such a protocol
description gives rise to m + 1 protocol steps, where the first protocol step (by the principal instantiating s1) does not
include an initial receiving action and the last protocol step (by the principal instantiating rm) consists only of receiving the
last message.
Formally, given a protocol instantiation σ , a protocol role 1 ≤ i ≤ j, and 0 ≤ k ≤ m, we define stepik = msg ik  msg ik+1,
where we assume thatmsg i0 = msg im+1 = ⟨⟩. Thus, we have:
stepik =

⟨fresh(f1,1) · · · fresh(f1,t1).send(M1, r1)⟩ if k = 0 and s1 = ai
⟨rec(Mk).fresh(fk+1,1) · · · fresh(fk+1,tk+1).send(Mk+1, rk+1)⟩ if 0 < k < m and
rk = sk+1 = ai
⟨rec(Mm)⟩ if k = m and rm = ai
⟨⟩ otherwise.
In this way, runi = msg i1  · · ·  msg im = stepi0  · · ·  stepim. If σ(ai) = A then we write stepiA,k(σ ) = σ(stepik), or simply
stepiA,k(σ (a), σ (f )) where a and f stand, respectively, for the sequences of identifiers and fresh data symbols used in the
protocol description.
Below, in step-compressedmodels,wewill require that the eventswhose labelsmatch a given protocol step by a principal
must be consecutive, that is, protocol steps will not be interleaved with other actions. Then, in intruder-centric models,
we will introduce explicit (trans)actions transiA,k(σ ) to represent each protocol step step
i
A,k(σ ). In Fig. 9, we illustrate the
successive transformation of a CBmodel to a ZB, CZB, and ZCmodel. For simplicity, we consider there a protocol of the form
a → b : (f1) . M1
b → a : (f2) . M2
The figure depicts a (possible attack) scenario where honest principals A and B are running the protocol, but B’s reply in the
second message is intercepted by the intruder, who then sends a fake message to A. While this happens, B is also starting
another protocol run with C .
5.2.1. Phase 1: Intruder as the channel
The first phase of our reduction is to merge the intruder with the channel, as illustrated by the two topmost models in
Fig. 9. We call the resulting models intruder-based models, or ZB models for short. In this step, we keep the same network
signature ⟨Princ,Num⟩. The intruder-based signature ΣZB is a distributed signature obtained from the network signature,
analogously to how we obtained the channel-based signature in Section 3.2. However, we now drop the channel, replacing
it by the intruder, and the actions send and rec of the intruder become the actions in and out of the new intruder. Moreover,
when constructing a ZB model from a CB model, we remove all events representing interaction between the channel and
the intruder. Hence, we delete the actions spy, send, and rec of the intruder and the action leak of the channel. The signature
ΣZB = ⟨Princ, Act, Prop⟩ is such that
• for each A ∈ Hon, ActA is composed of send(M, B), rec(M), and fresh(X), and PropA is composed of the state propositions
knows(M), where B ∈ Princ ,M ∈ Msg , and X ∈ Nonces ⊎ SymK ⊎ PubK ;
• ActZ contains in(A,M, B), out(A,M, B), and fresh(X), and PropZ contains the state propositions knows(M), where A, B ∈
Princ ,M ∈ Msg , and X ∈ Nonces ⊎ SymK ⊎ PubK .
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Fig. 9. From CB to ZCmodels (via ZB and CZBmodels).
The ZBmodelsµ are those satisfying the axioms (K), for honest principals, (F1–F2) of the CBmodel, which guarantee the
freshness and uniqueness of nonces, as well as:
(KZ) µZ , ξZ Z knows(M) iff M ∈ close({M ′|µZ , ξZ Z (Y knows(M ′)) ∨ (A,B∈Princ in(A,M ′, B)) ∨ fresh(M ′)}) for every
non-empty local state ξZ
(Z1) @Z [in(A,M, B)⇒ c⃝A[send(M, B)]]
(Z2′) @Z [out(Z,M, B)⇒ Y(knows(M) ∧ knows(B))]
(Z3) @Z [out(A,M, B)⇒ c⃝B[rec(M)]]
(P1) @A[send(M, B)⇒ Y(knows(M) ∧ knows(B))], for every A ∈ Hon
(PZ2) @A[send(M, B)⇒ @Z [in(A,M, B)]], for every A ∈ Hon
(PZ3) @A[rec(M)≫Z out(Z,M, A)], for every A ∈ Hon
(PZ5) @A[B∈Hon\{A} ¬ c⃝B[⊤]]
(PZ6′) @A[fresh(X)⇒¬ c⃝Z [⊤]]
(PZ6′′) @Z [fresh(X)⇒A≠Z ¬ c⃝A[⊤]]
Axiom (KZ) adapts axiom (K) for the intruder, which handles the new intruder action in, from which Z can learn new
messages. The axioms for the channel are adapted to the newmodel, replacing the channel by the intruder. Axioms (Z1) and
(Z3) (corresponding to (C1) and (C3), respectively) are not affected, apart from name replacement. Axiom (C2) is replaced by
(Z2’), aswe assume that all outputs are generated by the intruder and therefore do not have corresponding input actions. The
only requirement, in this case, is that the intruder knows all the necessary information to produce such messages. Axiom
(C4) is simply dropped, as spying actions are no longer needed. Some of the axioms for the principals’ behavior are also
adapted. Axiom (P1) is as before but with the restriction to honest agents, which applies also to some of the other axioms.
In axioms (PZ2) and (PZ3), the channel is replaced by the intruder. Axiom (P4) is dropped as there are no longer spy and
leak actions. Axiom (PZ5) is adapted to allow honest principals to communicate with the intruder but, as before, not with
other honest principals. Axiom (P6) is split into (PZ6′) and (PZ6′′), for honest agents and for the intruder, respectively.
As we changed the signature for the intruder by replacing send and rec actions by out and in actions, our formulas must
be rewritten accordingly. From now on, given a formula γ over a CB signature where spy and leak do not occur, we denote
by γ Ď the formula over the ZB signature obtained from γ by uniformly replacing all occurrences of send(M, A) local to Z by
out(Z,M, A), and all occurrences of rec(M) local to Z by

A∈Hon in(A,M, Z). In particular, secrS(σ )Ď is the same as secrS(σ )
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when all the principals are honest. The situation is similar for authentication, if both principals are honest. Note, however,
that Z now controls the channel and outputs all the messages received by honest principals. Hence, it makes no sense for
honest principals to authenticate the intruder.
Our goal is to prove that the two models are attack equivalent. We therefore start by defining a model transformation
β : CBΞ → ZBΞ . For each ⟨µCB, ξ⟩ ∈ CBΞ , with µCB = ⟨λ, α, π⟩, let β(µCB, ξ) = ⟨⟨λĎ, αĎ, πĎ⟩, ξ Ď⟩ such that
• µĎA = µA for A ∈ Hon and µĎZ is such that
– λĎZ = ⟨EvĎZ ,≤ĎZ ⟩, where EvĎZ = (EvZ ∪EvCh)\(EvZ ∩EvCh) and≤ĎZ is some discrete linearization of→Ch ∪ →Z restricted
to EvĎZ that has (ξ |Z ∪ ξ |Ch) ∩ EvĎZ as a local state;
– αĎZ (e) =

αCh(e) if e ∈ EvCh and αCh(e) = in(B,M, C) for some B,M, C
out(Z,M, C) if e ∈ EvCh and αCh(e) = out(B,M, C) for some B,M, C
αZ (e) if e ∈ EvZ \ EvCh;
– πĎZ is inductively defined as expected, requiring π
Ď
Z (∅) = πZ (∅);
• ξ ĎA = ξA and ξ ĎZ = (ξCh ∪ ξZ ) ∩ EvĎZ .
Note that αĎ is defined so that αĎA(e) = αA(e)Ď, for every A ∈ Princ and e ∈ EvĎA . We claim that ⟨µĎ, ξ Ď⟩ ∈ ZBΞ . As for
the construction ofµĎ, observe that the intruder inµĎ is obtained bymerging the old intruder with the channel. In doing so,
we drop some events, namely all synchronizations between the channel and the (old) intruder, e.g. leak and spy(M2), and
in(Z,M3, A) and send(M3, A) in the CB model in Fig. 9. Hence, all that remains from the old intruder are the fresh actions.
Moreover, the local successor relation→ĎZ is defined by a discrete linearization of the union of the successor relations of
the channel and the old intruder, e.g., fresh(F3) is moved before out(Z,M3, A) in the ZBmodel in Fig. 9. Note that it is always
possible to linearize these two relations in a way compatible with an existing state ξ . Note also that, as a consequence of
the remarks above, the map β is not injective.
We now prove some properties of this model transformation.
Lemma 5.7. Let ⟨µCB, ξ⟩ ∈ CBΞ , A ∈ Hon and ϕ ∈ L̸ c⃝A where spy does not occur. Then
1. µCB, ξ  @A[ϕ] if and only if β(µCB, ξ)  @A[ϕ];
2. µCB, ξ  @A[roleiA(σ )] if and only if β(µCB, ξ)  @A[roleiA(σ )].
Proof. The first condition follows from Lemma 2.2, given that for ⟨µĎ, ξ Ď⟩ = β(µCB, ξ) we have by construction µA = µĎA
and ξA = ξ ĎA . The second condition follows from the first as roles never involve communication formulas. 
In Lemma 5.7, we have that @A[ϕ]Ď equals @A[ϕ], and@A[roleiA(σ )]Ď equals @A[roleiA(σ )]. Next, we prove aweaker version
of this lemma for the intruder.
Lemma 5.8. Let ⟨µCB, ξ⟩ ∈ CBΞ . If µCB, ξ  @Z [knows(M)] then β(µCB, ξ)  @Z [knows(M)], for every message M.
Proof. Let ⟨µĎ, ξ Ď⟩ = β(µCB, ξ). IfµCB, ξ  @Ch[in(A,M, B)] thenµĎ, ξ Ď  @Z [P◦ in(A,M, B)] so, everymessage that Z could
eventually spy on the CBmodel is received by him in the ZBmodel. Using axiom (KZ), it follows thatµCB, ξ  @Z [knows(M)]
implies that µĎ, ξ Ď  @Z [knows(M)], which concludes the proof. 
Note that the converse of Lemma 5.8 fails since in β(µCB, ξ) the intruder knows all messages sent from one agent to
another, which is not the case for ⟨µCB, ξ⟩. From Lemmas 5.7 and 5.8, it follows that the transformation from CBmodels to
ZBmodels is attack preserving, as formalized below.
Proposition 5.9 (Attack Preservation). Let ⟨µCB, ξ⟩ ∈ CBΞ . Then,
• an attack on secrS(σ ) at ⟨µCB, ξ⟩ implies an attack on secrS(σ )Ď at β(µCB, ξ);
• an attack on authi,j,qA,B (σ ) at ⟨µCB, ξ⟩ implies an attack on authi,j,qA,B (σ )Ď at β(µCB, ξ).
To prove the converse, we first define a model transformation θ : ZBΞ → CBΞ . For each ⟨µZB, ξ Ď⟩ ∈ ZBΞ with
µZB = ⟨λĎ, αĎ, πĎ⟩ we introduce explicit communication events local to the channel. Hence, let Fr = {e ∈ EvĎZ |
α
Ď
Z (e) = fresh(X), for some X}, Succ = {e ∈ EvĎZ | αĎZ (e) = in(A,M, B), for some A,M, B}, NewS = {s(e) | e ∈ Succ},
Pred = {e ∈ EvĎZ | αĎZ (e) = out(Z,M, A), for someM, A}, NewP = {p(e) | e ∈ Pred}, and Sync = EvĎZ \ Fr. Note that s(e) and
p(e) denote new events representing successor and predecessor events of e in the channel. Then, θ(µZB, ξ Ď) = ⟨µ, ξ⟩ is as
follows.
• µA = µĎA for every A ∈ Hon;• µCh = ⟨λCh, αCh, πCh⟩with
– λCh = ⟨EvCh,≤Ch⟩where EvCh = (EvĎZ \ Fr) ∪ (NewS ∪ NewP), and→Ch is the successor relation obtained from≤ĎZ by
letting e →Ch s(e) for every e ∈ Succ, and p(e)→Ch e for every e ∈ Pred;
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– αCh(e) =

α
Ď
Z (e) if e ∈ EvĎZ \ Fr
leak if e ∈ NewS
in(Z,M, A) if e = p(e′) and αĎZ (e′) = out(Z,M, A)• µZ = ⟨λZ , αZ , πZ ⟩where
– λZ = ⟨EvZ ,≤Z ⟩ is such that EvZ = Fr ∪ NewS ∪ NewP , and→Z is obtained from→ĎZ by replacing every e ∈ Succ by
s(e), and every event in e ∈ Pred by p(e);
– αZ (e) =

spy(M) if e = s(e′) and αĎZ (e′) = in(A,M, B)
send(M, A) if e = p(e′) and αĎZ (e′) = out(Z,M, A)
α
Ď
Z (e) if e ∈ Fr
– πZ is inductively defined as expected, requiring πZ (∅) = πĎZ (∅).
• ξA = ξ ĎA for every A ∈ Hon, ξCh = (ξ ĎZ ∩ EvCh) ∪ {s(e) ∈ NewS | e ∈ ξ ĎZ } ∪ {p(e) ∈ NewP | e ∈ ξ ĎZ }, and ξZ =
(ξ
Ď
Z ∩ EvZ ) ∪ {s(e) ∈ NewS | e ∈ ξ ĎZ } ∪ {p(e) ∈ NewP | e ∈ ξ ĎZ }.
Note that although θ is not the inverse of β , there is a clear relationship between θ(β(µCB, ξ)) and ⟨µCB, ξ⟩. Namely, the
former is precisely the CB interpretation structure in β−1(β(µCB, ξ)) that maximizes the activity of the intruder in terms of
spying every possible message from the channel as soon as possible.
We claim that θ(µZB, ξ Ď) = ⟨µ, ξ⟩ is a CB model. Recall the ZB model (the second) depicted in Fig. 9 and consider,
for instance, the event e ∈ EvĎB ∩ EvĎZ such that αĎB(e) = send(M2, A) and αĎZ (e) = in(B,M2, A). Then, as also shown in
the topmost CB model, we have two events e, s(e) ∈ EvCh with e ∈ EvB and s(e) ∈ EvZ such that αB(e) = send(M2, A),
αCh(e) = in(B,M2, A), αCh(s(e)) = leak, and αZ (s(e)) = spy(M2). Intruder sending actions are introduced similarly. In the
translation of the global state, we add to ξ both the events corresponding to incoming messages from other principals that
were already in ξ Ď and all outgoing messages from the intruder.
The proof of the following lemma is analogous to the proof of Lemma 5.7.
Lemma 5.10. Let ⟨µZB, ξ Ď⟩ ∈ ZBΞ , A ∈ Hon, and ϕ ∈ L̸ c⃝A where spy does not occur. Then
1. θ(µZB, ξ Ď)  @A[ϕ] if and only if µZB, ξ Ď  @A[ϕ];
2. θ(µZB, ξ Ď)  @A[roleiA(σ )] if and only if µZB, ξ Ď  @A[roleiA(σ )].
Observe that in the construction of the translated model, the intruder spies on every message that enters the channel.
He therefore has the same knowledge as in the ZBmodel and we can establish the following result.
Lemma 5.11. Let ⟨µZB, ξ Ď⟩ ∈ ZBΞ . Then
1. θ(µZB, ξ Ď)  @Z [P◦ a] if and only if ⟨µZB, ξ Ď⟩  @Z [P◦ aĎ], for non-spying a ∈ ActZ inΣCB;
2. θ(µZB, ξ Ď)  @Z [knows(M)] if and only if ⟨µZB, ξ Ď⟩  @Z [knows(M)], for every message M.
Proof. 1. By the construction of αZ , the intruder in θ(µZB, ξ Ď) never receives messages. If a is a fresh generation action,
then the result is trivial. If a = send(M, A), then it must be the label of an event p(e′) such that the label of e′ is
aĎ = out(Z,M, A).
2. The knowledge set computed with (KZ) at the given ⟨µZB, ξ Ď⟩ is the same that can be computed using (K), for principal
Z , by just exchanging each in(A,M, B)with spy(M), and recalling that πZ (∅) = πĎZ (∅). 
Lemmas 5.10 and 5.11 yield the following proposition, formalizing attack reflection.
Proposition 5.12 (Attack reflection). Let ⟨µZB, ξ Ď⟩ ∈ ZBΞ . Then,
• an attack on secrS(σ )Ď at ⟨µZB, ξ Ď⟩ implies an attack on secrS(σ ) at θ(µZB, ξ Ď);
• an attack on authi,j,qA,B (σ )Ď at ⟨µZB, ξ Ď⟩ implies an attack on authi,j,qA,B (σ ) at θ(µZB, ξ Ď).
As a corollary, we conclude that the two models are attack equivalent.
Corollary 5.13. The models CB and ZB are attack equivalent.
5.2.2. Phase 2: Step compression
We now apply step compression, a model reduction technique used to improve the efficiency of various protocol analysis
tools, such as [3,10,23,49,52]. The essence of step compression is that when an honest principal receives a message, he
immediately sends a reply. As shown in the third model of Fig. 9, this reduction technique groups together entire protocol
steps of honest agents into consecutive sequences of actions in the resulting model, as depicted inside the boxes.
Step-compressed models, or CZB models, are ZB models with an additional restriction. Recall that, for each A ∈ Hon,
the sequence of actions labeling A’s local life-cycle must interleave prefixes of pairwise independent instantiations of
protocol runs for principal A. Let runiA(σ ) = stepiA,0(σ )  · · ·  stepiA,m(σ ) = ⟨act0,1 · · · act0,n0⟩  ⟨act1,1 · · · act1,n1⟩  · · · ⟨actm,1 · · · actm,nm⟩ = ⟨act0,1 · · · act0,n0 .act1,1 · · · act1,n1 · · · actm,1 · · · actm,nm⟩ be one such run and consider the prefix⟨· · · actk,uk⟩, with k ≤ m and uk ≤ nk. Then, for each 0 ≤ q ≤ k, we let uq = nq and require that there are consecutive
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events eiq+1 →A · · · →A eiq+uq such that αA(eiq+1) = actq,1, . . . , αA(eiq+uq) = actq,uq , i.e., the actions within a step cannot
be interleaved with other actions. Below, we refer to the last event eiq+uq as the anchor event for step q of the run. It should
be clear that with the exception of the initial and final steps of a run, every non-empty intermediate step must start with
a receiving action and end with a sending action. Thus, we will also require that the corresponding shared events on the
intruder side are consecutive. That is, for each 1 ≤ q ≤ k, such q ≠ m and uq = nq ≠ 0, we require that eiq+1 →Z eiq+nq .
At the specification level, this corresponds to adding axioms of the form:
(SCiA,q,uq(σ )) @A[actq,uq ⇒ Y(actq,uq−1 ∧ Y(. . . ∧ Y actq,1 . . . ))], for each uq ≤ nq ≠ 0;
(ZSCiA,q(σ )) @Z [ c⃝A[actq,nq ] ⇒ Y c⃝A[actq,1]], for each 0 < q < mwith nq ≠ 0.
Wewill show that if there is an attack on a security goal in an intruder-basedmodel, then there is also a step-compressed
model where the attack happens. The idea is to delay the events corresponding to each protocol step so that they are as close
as possible to the step’s anchor event, and similarly for the intruder model, to delay the out actions so that they are next to
the corresponding in actions, as described above. We now give the associated construction.
To establish the attack preservation results, we first define a model transformation β : ZB → CZB. In this case, we do
not consider states in the translation as the attacks on the different security goals may require constructing different global
states. For each µZB = ⟨λ, α, π⟩ ∈ ZB, we define the sets of floating events that must be reordered when constructing the
step-compressed model as FltA = {e ∈ EvA | e is not an anchor event} for each A ∈ Hon, and FltZ = EvZ ∩ (A∈Hon FltA).
Then, β(µZB) = ⟨λ♭, α♭, π ♭⟩ is as follows:
• for A ∈ Hon, µ♭A = ⟨λ♭A, α♭A, π ♭A⟩ is:
– λ♭A = ⟨Ev♭A,≤♭A⟩where Ev♭A = EvA and→♭A results from restricting≤A to anchor events in EvA \ FltA, and requiring that
eq,1 →♭A eq,2 →♭A · · · →♭A eq,uq where eq,uq is the anchor event of the protocol step corresponding to the αA labels of
the events eq,1 ≤A eq,2 ≤A · · · ≤A eq,uq−1 ≤A eq,uq ;
– α♭A = αA and π ♭A(∅) = πA(∅);
• for the intruder Z , µ♭Z = ⟨λ♭Z , α♭Z , π ♭Z ⟩where:
– λ♭Z = ⟨Ev♭Z ,≤♭Z ⟩where Ev♭Z = EvZ and→♭Z is the restriction of≤Z to anchor events in EvZ \ FltZ , where we additionally
require that eq,1 →♭Z eq,nq where eq,1 ≤Z eq,nq are the first and last events of a complete protocol step by some honest
principal, and that→♭Z is compatible with the definition of≤♭A for all the other floating events;
– α♭Z = αZ and π ♭Z (∅) = πZ (∅).
In β(µZB), protocol steps are grouped together as illustrated by the boxes in the CZB model in Fig. 9. This grouping
preserves the ordering of actions within runs and therefore also within steps. Only the interleaving of the different steps
may change. Hence, β(µZB) is still a ZBmodel and, since it satisfies the restrictions, it is also a CZBmodel. To show that this
transformation is attack preserving, we first prove two auxiliary results.
Lemma 5.14. Let µZB ∈ ZB and let ξ be one of its global states. For each global state ξ ♭ of β(µZB) such that last(ξA) = last(ξ ♭A),
for A ∈ Hon, we have
µZB, ξ  @A[roleiA(σ )] if and only if β(µZB), ξ ♭  @A[roleiA(σ )].
Proof. Assume that µZB, ξ  @A[roleiA(σ )]. Then, µZBA , ξA A roleiA(σ ). Assume also that runiA(σ ) = ⟨act1 · · · actn⟩.
Hence, there are e1, . . . , en ∈ EvA such that e1 <A · · · <A en, αA(ei) = acti, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and last(ξA) = en. By
construction, e1, . . . , en ∈ Ev♭A and α♭A(ei) = acti, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Furthermore, since e1, . . . , en are associated with the
same protocol run, then e1 <
♭
A · · · <♭A en by the construction of→♭A. Hence, as last(ξ ♭A) = last(ξA) = en, it follows that
β(µZB), ξ
♭  @A[roleiA(σ )]. The proof of the converse is similar. 
Lemma 5.15. Let A ∈ Hon, µZB ∈ ZB, and ξ be a global state of µZB such that last(ξA) = eA ∈ EvA ∩ EvZ is an anchor event. Let
ξ ♭ be the least global state of β(µZB) such that last(ξ
♭
A) = eA. Then ξ ♭Z ⊆ ξZ , and for every B ∈ Hon \ {A}, if e ∈ ξ ♭B is such that
e ∈ EvB ∩ EvZ is an anchor event, then e ∈ ξB.
Proof. To start with, note that ξ ♭ = eA↓ under the global ordering ≤♭ . To show that ξ ♭Z ⊆ ξZ , let e ∈ ξ ♭Z . As eA ∈ EvZ , we
have that e ≤♭Z eA. Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that e /∈ ξZ . Then e >Z eA and from the construction of→♭Z we
conclude that e is not an anchor event. Thus, in the construction, e was moved towards its anchor event, which must also
be after eA. Hence e >
♭
Z eA, which contradicts e ≤♭Z eA. Finally, let B ∈ Hon \ {A} and e ∈ ξ ♭B be such that e ∈ EvB ∩ EvZ is an
anchor event. As both e, eA ∈ EvZ are anchor events, then e ≤♭Z eA and the definition of→♭Z imply that e ≤Z eA. Therefore,
e ∈ ξZ and also e ∈ ξB. 
We could also show, under the conditions of the previous lemma, that ξ ♭A ⊆ ξA. However, this fact would not be useful
for proving our envisaged result.
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Lemma 5.16 (Attack Preservation). Let ⟨µZB, ξ⟩ ∈ ZBΞ . Then,
• an attack on secrS(σ )Ď at ⟨µZB, ξ⟩ implies an attack on secrS(σ ) at some state of β(µZB);
• an attack on authi,j,qA,B (σ )Ď at ⟨µZB, ξ⟩ implies an attack on authi,j,qA,B (σ )Ď at some state of β(µZB).
Proof. Let µ♭ = β(µZB). Assume that an attack on secrS(σ )Ď happens at the global state ξ of µZB. Let ξ ♭ be the least global
of µ♭ that contains ξ . Then, µZB, ξ 
j
i=1 @Ai [P◦ roleiAi(σ )] and µZB, ξ ̸

B∈Princ\{A1,...,Aj}

M∈S @B[¬ knows(M)]. From
Lemma 5.14, since ξ ⊆ ξ ♭, it follows that µ♭, ξ ♭  ji=1 @Ai [P◦ roleiAi(σ )]. Furthermore, as ξ ♭ extends ξ and the labeling of
events does not change, we also have that µ♭, ξ ♭ ̸

B∈Princ\{A1,...,Aj}

M∈S @B[¬ knows(M)].
Assume now that an attack on authi,j,qA,B (σ )
Ď happens at the global state ξ ofµZB. Let ξ ♭ be the least global state ofµ♭ such
that last(ξ ♭A) = last(ξA). Then, µZB, ξ  @A[roleiA(σ )] and µZB, ξ ̸ @B[P◦ send(σ (M), A)]Ď. It follows from Lemma 5.14 that
µ♭, ξ ♭  @A[roleiA(σ )]. Note also that any event of B ∈ Hon\ {A} labeled with a sending action is necessarily an anchor event
shared with the channel. Thus, Lemma 5.15 guarantees that µ♭, ξ ♭ ̸ @B[P◦ send(σ (M), A)]Ď. 
Hence, the two models are attack equivalent. Note that we do not state a reflection result because any CZBmodel is also
a ZBmodel.
Corollary 5.17. The models ZB and CZB are attack equivalent.
5.2.3. Phase 3: Intruder-centric models
In our last translation step, we ‘‘forget’’ the honest agents and keep only the intruder, as illustrated in the last twomodels
of Fig. 9. An intruder-centric signatureΣZC is a distributed signature obtained from the network signature with just one agent
identifier, Z , for the intruder. Hence, ΣZC = ⟨{Z}, Act, Prop⟩ where, recalling the Alice-and-Bob-style protocol description
above:
• ActZ contains all the actions transiA,k(σ ), for each A ∈ Princ , each protocol role 0 ≤ i ≤ j, each 0 ≤ k ≤ m, and each
protocol instantiation σ , as well as fresh(X) for X ∈ Nonces ⊎ SymK ⊎ PrivK ;
• PropZ contains all the state propositions knowsA(M), for every A ∈ Princ andM ∈ Msg .
Note that we are considering the same network signature ⟨Princ,Num⟩ as before.
Before we proceed to establish the preservation results, we need some auxiliary notation:
• recs(⟨act1 · · · actk⟩) = {M | acti = rec(M) for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k};
• snds(⟨act1 · · · actk⟩) = {M | acti = send(M, A) for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k and A};
• fshs(⟨act1 · · · actk⟩) = {X | acti = fresh(X) for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k}.
We define the knowledge learned by a B ∈ Hon in a transaction as follows:
• learnB(transiA,k(σ )) =
∅ if A ≠ B
recs(stepiA,k(σ )) ∪ fshs(stepiA,k(σ )) otherwise;
• learnB(fresh(X)) = ∅.
The knowledge learned by the intruder in each action, assuming stepiA,k(σ ) = ⟨act1 · · · actnk⟩, is:
• learnZ (transiA,k(σ )) =
∅ if actnk ≠ send(M, A) for any A,M
snds(stepiA,k(σ )) otherwise;
• learnZ (fresh(X)) = {X}.
Next, we rewrite all the relevant axioms in this new setting. These include axioms about knowledge, axioms to guarantee
freshness and uniqueness of the data generated by each principal, and principal axioms among others.
(K•) µ, ξ  knowsA(M) iffM ∈ close({M ′|µ, ξ  Y knowsA(M ′)} ∪ learnA(α(last(ξ)))), for every state ξ
(F1•Z) @Z [fresh(X)⇒ Y(¬ knowsZ (M))]
(F2•Z) @Z [fresh(X)⇒

A∈Hon ¬ knowsA(M)]
(F1•A) @Z [transiA,k(σ )⇒ Y(¬ knowsA(M ′))]
(F2•A) @Z [transiA,k(σ )⇒

B∈Princ\{A ¬ knowsB(M ′)].
Here M ranges over all messages such that cont(X) ∩ cont(M) ≠ ∅ and M ′ ranges over all messages such that cont(X ′) ∩
cont(M ′) ≠ ∅, for every X ′ ∈ fshs(stepiA,k(σ )). Observe that these are exactly the same axioms as (F1− 2), but written in
this new language.
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Next, we rewrite the axioms about keys, where we assume that A, B ∈ Princ and A ≠ B.
(aKey1•) @Z [∗ ⇒ knowsA(K−1A )]
(aKey2•) @Z [∗ ⇒ ¬ knowsB(M)], for everyM containing K−1A
(sKey1.1•) @Z [∗ ⇒ knowsA(KAB)]
(sKey1.2•) @Z [∗ ⇒ knowsB(KAB)]
(sKey2•) @Z [∗ ⇒ ¬ knowsC (M)], for every C ∈ Princ \ {A, B} and everyM containing KAB.
We may also assume, for simplicity, that all principals A, B ∈ Princ know each other’s names and public keys from the
start.
(N•) @Z [∗ ⇒ knowsA(B)]
(PK•) @Z [∗ ⇒ knowsA(KB)].
In order for µ to be a model of the protocol, we require that it satisfies the above axioms and also that the projection of
the trace on each honest agent A, after expanding the actions, is still a legal run, i.e. an interleaving of prefixes of runs (as
before). We delay the details of this expansion until the definition of the model transformation θ from ZC models to CZB
models.
Observe that our notion of model requires, for every transiA,q(σ ) and trans
i
A,k(σ ) with k < q, that @Z [transiA,q(σ ) ⇒
P transiA,k(σ )].
The change in the language also affects how our security goals are written. Consider first the notion of role. In this setting,
if runiA(σ ) = stepiA,k1  · · ·  stepiA,kq then
roleiA(σ )
• ≡ transiA,kq(σ ) ∧ P(transiA,kq−1(σ ) ∧ P(. . . ∧ P transiA,k1(σ ))).
To express that the messages in a finite set S will remain a shared secret between participants A1, . . . , Aj after the
complete execution of a protocol under the instantiation σ , with σ(ai) = Ai, we write:
@Z
 j
i=1
P◦ roleiAi(σ )
•

⇒

M∈S

B∈Princ\{A1,...,Aj}
¬ knowsB(M)

and denote this formula by secrS(σ )•.
As for authentication properties, let σ be a protocol instantiation such that σ(ai) = A ∈ Hon and σ(aj) = B ∈ Hon. Then
the property that A authenticates B in role j at step q of the protocol can be defined by the following formula authi,j,qA,B (σ )
•,
assuming thatmsgq of the protocol requires that B sends the messageM to A:
@Z [roleiA(σ )• ⇒ P◦ transjB,q(σ )].
Note that it must be the case that stepjB,q(σ ) = ⟨act1 · · · actk⟩ and actk = send(M, A).
We now proceed to prove that the two models are attack equivalent. We start by defining the model transformation
θ : ZC → CZB from ZCmodels to SCmodels, which is considerably easier than the converse direction. The following notation
will be useful. LetµZC = ⟨λ•, α•, π•⟩ ∈ ZCwith λ = ⟨Ev•,→•⟩ and A ∈ Hon.We denote by EvA the events of Ev• that involve
actions from A and we will need as many as the number of atomic actions in each of the corresponding steps. Hence, we
define
EvA = {(e, k) | e ∈ Ev•Z , α•(e) = transiA,q(σ ) and 1 ≤ k ≤ |stepiA,q(σ )|}.
We also need a similar construction for the intruder:
EvZ = {(e, 1) | e ∈ Ev•Z , α•Z (e) = transiA,q(σ ) and (stepiA,q(σ ))1 = rec(M) for someM} ∪
{(e, k) | e ∈ Ev•Z , α•Z (e) = transiA,q(σ ), |stepiA,q(σ )| = k and
|stepiA,q(σ )|k = send(M, B) for some B,M} ∪{(e, 1) | e ∈ Ev•Z and α•Z (e) = fresh(X) for some X} .
Then θ(µZC) = ⟨λ, α, π⟩ is as follows:
• µA = ⟨λA, αA, πA⟩, for each A ∈ Hon, is
– λA = ⟨EvA,≤A⟩ such that (e1, k1) ≤A (e2, k2) if e1 ≤•Z e2, or e1 = e2 and k1 < k2;
– αA((e, k)) = (stepiA,q(σ ))k if α•(e) = transiA,q;
– πA(∅) = {knows(M) | knowsA(M) ∈ π•Z (∅)};
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• µZ = ⟨λZ , αZ , πZ ⟩ is
– λZ = ⟨EvZ ,≤Z ⟩ such that (e1, k1) ≤Z (e2, k2) if e1 ≤•Z e2, or e1 = e2 and k1 < k2;
– αZ ((e, k)) =

out(Z,M, A) if αA((e, k)) = rec(M), for the unique A ∈ Hon
such that (e, k) ∈ EvA
in(A,M, B) if αA((e, k)) = send(M, B), for the unique A ∈ Hon
such that (e, k) ∈ EvA
α•Z (e) otherwise;
– πZ (∅) = {knows(M) | knowsZ (M) ∈ π•Z (∅)}.
Our construction of CZBmodels is quite intuitive.We simply expand each action transjA,q(σ ) into its corresponding atomic
actions. For instance, in Fig. 9, transInitA,0 in the ZCmodel is expanded to fresh(F1)→A send(M1, B) for A and to in(A,M1, B) for
Z in the corresponding CZBmodel.
Given the above translation, it is straightforward to define a translation for states. Given a ZC state ξ • then ξ is the CZB
state such that ξA = {(e, k) ∈ EvA | e ∈ ξ •Z } for each A ∈ Princ .
Next, we prove the reflection of attacks on security goals from ZCmodels to CZBmodels. We start with some preliminary
results.
Lemma 5.18. Let µZC ∈ ZC and let ξ • be one of its states. Then, for every A ∈ Princ
µZC, ξ
•  @Z [knowsA(M)] if and only if θ(µZC), ξ  @A[knows(M)], for every M.
Proof. Assume that A ∈ Hon and let µ = θ(µZC). Then, µZC, ξ •  @Z [knowsA(M)] iff knowsA(M) ∈ π•Z (ξ •) iff M ∈
close({M ′ | knowsA(M ′) ∈ π•Z (∅)} ∪

e∈ξ• learnA(α
•
Z (e))) iff M ∈ close({M ′ | knows(M ′) ∈ πA(∅)} ∪

e∈ξA recs(αA(e)) ∪
fshs(αA(e)) iff knows(M) ∈ πA(ξA) iff µ, ξ  @A[knows(M)].
For the intruder, we have that µZC, ξ •  @Z [knowsZ (M)] iff knowsZ (M) ∈ π•Z (ξ •) iff M ∈ close({M ′ | knowsZ (M ′) ∈
π•Z (∅)} ∪

e∈ξ• learnZ (α
•
Z (e))) iff M ∈ close({M ′ | knows(M ′) ∈ πZ (∅)} ∪ (

A∈Hon

e∈(ξZ∩EvA) snds(αA(e))) ∪
(

A∈Hon

e∈(ξZ \EvA) fshs(αZ (e))) iff knows(M) ∈ πZ (ξZ ) iff µ, ξ  @Z [knows(M)]. 
Lemma 5.19. Let µZC ∈ ZC and let ξ • be one of its states. Then, for every A ∈ Hon
µZC, ξ
•  @Z [transiA,q(σ )] if and only if θ(µZC), ξ  SCiA,q,uq(σ ).
Proof. Let µ = θ(µZC). Then, µZC, ξ •  @Z [transiA,q(σ )] iff last(ξ •Z ) = e and α•Z (e) = transiA,q(σ ) iff, by definition of µA,
there exist events (e, 1), . . . , (e, uq) ∈ EvA such that (e, 1)→A · · · →A (e, uq) and αA((e, j)) = actq,j, for j ∈ {1, . . . , uq}, iff
µ, ξ  SCiA,q,uq(σ ), observing that last(ξA) = (e, uq). 
An immediate consequence of the previous result is the following lemma.
Lemma 5.20. Let µZC ∈ ZC and let ξ • be one of its states. Then, for every A ∈ Hon
µZC, ξ
•  @Z [roleiA(σ )•] if and only if θ(µZC), ξ  @A[roleiA(σ )].
These results allow us to establish the following proposition.
Proposition 5.21 (Attack Reflection). Let µZC and let ξ • be one of its local states. Then,
• an attack on secrS(σ )• at ⟨µZC, ξ •⟩ implies an attack on secrS(σ )Ď at ⟨θ(µZC), ξ⟩;
• an attack on authi,j,qA,B (σ )• at ⟨µZC, ξ •⟩ implies an attack on authi,j,qA,B (σ )Ď at ⟨θ(µZC), ξ⟩.
Proof. Let µ = θ(µZC). Assume that an attack on secrS(σ )• happens at the global state ξ • of µZC. Then, it must be the case
that µZC, ξ •  @Z [ji=1 P◦ roleiAi(σ )•] and also that µZC, ξ • ̸ @Z [M∈S B∈Princ\{A1,...,Aj} ¬ knowsB(M)]. From Lemma 5.20,
it follows that µ, ξ 
j
i=1 @Ai [P◦ roleiAi(σ )], and from Lemma 5.18, it follows that µ, ξ ̸

M∈S

B∈Princ\{A1,...,Aj}
@B[¬ knows(M)]. Hence, an attack on secrS(σ )Ď happens at the global state ξ of µ.
Assume now that an attack on authi,j,qA,B (σ )
• happens at the global state ξ • of µZC, for B ∈ Hon. Then, µZC, ξ • 
@Z [roleiA(σ )•] andµZC, ξ • ̸ @Z [P◦ transjB,q(σ )]. FromLemma5.20, it follows thatµ, ξ  @A[roleiA(σ )], and fromLemma5.19,
it follows that µ, ξ  P◦ SCiB,q,uq(σ )
5. Note that, by the construction of µ and ξ , and by the fact that B ∈ Hon and, thus, is
following his role in the protocol, it cannot be the case that µ, ξ  @B[P◦ actq,uq ] and µ, ξ ̸ @B[P◦ Y(actq,uq−1 ∧ Y(. . . ∧
Y actq,1))]. Furthermore, by the definition of authi,j,qA,B (σ )•, we have that actq,uq = send(M, A). Hence, µ, ξ ̸ @B[P◦ actq,uq ].
Thus, an attack on authi,j,qA,B (σ )
• happens at the global state ξ of µ. 
5 Here, we write P◦ SCiB,q,uq (σ ) for @B[P◦(actq,uq ⇒ Y(actq,uq−1 ∧ Y(. . . ∧ Y actq,1 . . . )))].
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Now, we prove the converse: if an attack on a security goal occurs in a CZB model it is possible to mimic that attack
in a ZC model. In this case, we consider two different model transformations depending on the type of attack that we are
considering. This has to do with the way we treat incomplete steps. In first transformation, we include the incomplete steps
in the resulting model as we will use this translation to show attack preservation on secrecy properties. Then, we consider a
second transformation where we forget all the incomplete steps and use this to show attack preservation on authentication
properties.
Let µCZB = ⟨λ, α, π⟩ ∈ CZB. We consider the following sets of events:
• Ev•f = {e ∈ EvZ | αZ (e) = fresh(X), for some X},
• Ev•c =

A∈Hon{e ∈ EvZ | e is an anchor event in some run of A},• Ev•a =

A∈Hon{e ∈ EvA | e is an anchor event in some run of A}.
Note that the set Ev•c contains the (anchor) events corresponding to all the steps that were completed. In contrast, Ev
•
a
contains all (anchor) events of steps that were started, including the ones corresponding to incomplete steps. Observe that
if a step was completed, then the anchor event is shared between the agent and the intruder (the last action of a step is
always a send or a rec). If the step was not completed then the anchor event might not be shared with the intruder, but will
always be an event of the agent performing that step. In fact, Ev•c ⊆ Ev•a .
The first model transformation that we consider is β1 : CZB → ZC, which we use to show the preservation of attacks on
secrecy properties. In this case, β1(µCZB) = ⟨λ•, α•, π•⟩ is as follows:
• Ev•Z = Ev•f ∪ Ev•a and≤•Z is any linearization of Ev•Z compatible with≤Z ;
• α•Z (e) =

αZ (e) if e ∈ Ev•f
transiA,q(σ ) if e ∈ Ev•a and e occurs in stepiA,q(σ ) ;
• π•Z (∅) =

A∈Princ{knowsA(M) | knows(M) ∈ πA(∅)}.
In the following, given a global state ξ of µCZB, we denote by ξ • the global state of β1(µCZB) such that ξ •Z = (ξZ ∩ Ev•f ) ∪
(

A∈Hon ξA ∩ Ev•a).
Lemma 5.22. Let µCZB ∈ CZB and let ξ be one of its local states. Then, for every A ∈ Hon,
if µCZB, ξ  SCiA,q,uq(σ ) then β
1(µCZB), ξ
•  @Z [P◦ transiA,q(σ )].
Proof. Let µ• = β1(µCZB). If µCZB, ξ  SCiA,q,uq(σ ), then there exist e1 →A · · · →A eu,q such that αA(ej) = (stepiA,q(σ ))j. In
particular, euq is an anchor and thus euq ∈ ξ •. Furthermore, α•Z (euq) = transiA,q(σ ) and, so, µ•, ξ •  @Z [P◦ transiA,q(σ )]. 
Lemma 5.23. Let µCZB ∈ CZB and let ξ be one of its local states. Then, for every A ∈ Hon,
if µCZB, ξ  @A[roleiA(σ )] then β1(µCZB), ξ •  @Z [P◦ roleiA(σ )•].
Proof. Let β1(µCZB) = µ• and runiA(σ ) = stepiA,0(σ )  · · ·  stepiA,m(σ ) = ⟨act0,1 · · · act0,n0 . act1,1 · · · act1,n1 · · · actm,1 · · ·
actm,nm⟩. If µCZB, ξ  @A[roleiA(σ )] then there are e0,1 →A · · · →A e0,n0 ≤A · · · ≤A em,1 →A · · · →A em,nm such
that αA(ej,k) = actj,k. In particular, ej,nj , with j ∈ {0, . . . ,m}, are all anchor events and are all shared with Z . Hence,
e0,n0 ≤Z · · · ≤Z em,nm and, furthermore, ej,nj ∈ Ev•Z , for j ∈ {0, . . . ,m}. Thus, ej,nj ∈ ξ •Z , α•Z (ej,nj) = transiA,j(σ ), and
e0,n0 ≤•Z · · · ≤•Z em,nm . Hence µ•, ξ •  @Z [P◦ roleiA(σ )•]. 
Lemma 5.24. Let µCZB ∈ CZB and let ξ be one of its local states. Then, for every A ∈ Princ,
if µCZB, ξ  @A[knows(M)] then β1(µCZB), ξ •  @Z [knowsA(M)].
Proof. We start by proving that

e∈ξA recs(αA(e)) ∪ fshs(αA(e)) ⊆

e∈ξ•Z learnA(α
•
Z (e)). Let e ∈ ξA such that αA(e) occurs
in some stepiA,q(σ ). If e is an anchor event, then e ∈ ξ •Z and α•Z (e) = transiA,q(σ ). Hence, recs(αA(e)) ∪ fshs(αA(e)) ⊆
learnA(α•Z (e)). If e is not an anchor event, let e′ be its anchor event. Again, e′ ∈ ξ •Z and α•Z (e′) = transiA,q(σ ), and, so,
recs(αA(e)) ∪ fshs(αA(e)) ⊆ learnA(α•Z (e′)). The rest of the proof follows as in Lemma 5.18 using this result. 
Proposition 5.25 (Attack Preservation – Secrecy). LetµCZB ∈ CZB and let ξ be one of its local states. Then an attack on secrS(σ )Ď
at ⟨µCZB, ξ⟩ implies an attack on secrS(σ )• at ⟨β1(µCZB), ξ •⟩.
Proof. The proof of this result is similar to the proof of Proposition 5.21 using Lemmas 5.23 and 5.24. 
We now focus of authentication properties, where the model translation will only consider the anchor events from
completed steps. All incomplete steps will be ignored. In this case, β2(µCZB) = ⟨λ•, α•, π•⟩ is as follows:
• Ev•Z = Ev•f ∪ Ev•c and≤•Z is the restriction of≤Z to Ev•Z ;
• α•Z and π•Z are as in β1.
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In the following, given a global state ξ of µCZB and A ∈ Hon, we denote by ξ •A the global state of β2(µCZB) such that
(ξ •A )Z = last(ξA) ↓ (in β2(µCZB)).
Lemma 5.26. Let A ∈ Hon, µCZB ∈ CZB, and ξ be a global state of µCZB such that last(ξA) ∈ EvA ∩ EvZ is an anchor event. Then,
(ξ •A )Z ⊆ ξZ , and for every B ∈ Hon \ {A}, if e ∈ (ξ •A )Z is such that e ∈ EvB ∩ EvZ is an anchor event, then e ∈ ξB.
Proof. The condition on Z is straightforward by construction of Ev•Z . Let eA = last(ξA). As both e and eA are anchor events
then e, aA ∈ Ev•Z . If e ∈ (ξ •A )Z , then it must be the case that e ≤•Z eA. Hence, e ≤Z eA which implies that e ∈ ξZ and, so,
e ∈ ξB. 
Lemma 5.27. Let µCZB ∈ CZB and let ξ be one of its local states. Then, for every A ∈ Hon and j ∈ {1, . . . , |stepiA,q(σ )|},
if β2(µCZB), ξ •A  @Z [P◦ transiA,q(σ )] then µCZB, ξ  @A[P◦(stepiA,q(σ ))j].
Proof. Let µ• = β2(µCZB) and assume that stepiA,q(σ ) = ⟨act1 . . . actk⟩. If µ•, ξ •A  @Z [P◦ transiA,q(σ )] then there is an
e ∈ (ξ •A )Z such that α•Z (e)) = transiA,q(σ ). Furthermore, e ∈ EvA ∩ EvZ and e is an anchor event, and so, e ∈ ξA. By the
definition of anchor events, there are e1 →A · · · →A ek = e such that αA(ej) = actj. Hence, ej ∈ ξA and the result
follows. 
Lemma 5.28. Let µCZB ∈ CZB and let ξ be one of its local states. Then, for every A ∈ Hon,
β2(µCZB), ξ
•
A  @Z [roleiA(σ )•] iff µCZB, ξ  @A[roleiA(σ )].
Proof. Let β2(µCZB) = µ• and runiA(σ ) = stepiA,0(σ )  · · ·  stepiA,m(σ ) = ⟨act0,1 · · · act0,n0 . act1,1 · · · act1,n1 · · · actm,1 · · ·
actm,nm⟩. Assume that µCZB, ξ  @A[roleiA(σ )]. Then, there are e0,1 →A e0,n0 ≤A · · · ≤A em,1 →A em,nm such that
αA(ej,k) = actj,k with em,nm = last(ξA) and such that ej,nj ∈ EvA ∩ EvZ are anchor events. Then, by construction,
e0,n0 ≤•Z · · · ≤•Z em,nm and α•Z (ej,nj) = transiA,j(σ ). This implies that µ•, ξ •A  @Z [roleiA(σ )•], since last((ξ •A )Z ) = em,nm .
The proof of the converse is similar. 
Proposition 5.29 (Attack Preservation – Authentication). Let µCZB ∈ CZB and let ξ be one of its local states. Then an attack on
authi,j,qA,B (σ )
Ď at ⟨µCZB, ξ⟩ implies an attack on authi,j,qA,B (σ )• at ⟨β2(µCZB), ξ •A ⟩.
Proof. The proof of this result is similar to the proof of Proposition 5.21 using Lemmas 5.27 and 5.28. 
From Propositions 5.21, 5.25 and 5.29, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 5.30. The models CZB and ZC are attack equivalent.
6. Related work and conclusions
Communication, distribution, and cryptography are the essential ingredients of security protocols. Many attacks on
security protocols arise fromproblems in communication and distribution, rather than cryptography itself. Hence, we follow
the approach often taken in the formal methods community of abstracting away cryptographic details by assuming perfect
black-box cryptography. The remaining ingredients — communication and distribution — are precisely the central concepts
underlying DTL, which suggests DTL’s suitability for this domain. DTL is neutral with respect to the kinds of interpretation
structures it formalizes and, as we showed through our case studies, by choosing different signatures and axioms, we can
define theories that are well suited for formalizing and reasoning about different application domains and problems in
security protocol analysis.
DTL is closely related to the family of temporal logics whose semantics are based on the models of true concurrency,
introduced and developed in [40,41,57]. DTL was proposed in [34] as a logic for specifying and reasoning about distributed
information systems and several versions were given, reflecting different perspectives on how non-local information can
be accessed by each agent [8,16,17]. In this paper, we use the simplest and most expressive formulation, from [8]. We stick
with a propositional language, which suits our purposes, as we describe our schema axioms by taking advantage of explicit
meta-level quantifications and of the inductive definition of closed sets of messages.
Of course, there are other formalisms for modeling distributed, communicating systems. A key difference is that DTL
provides not just amodeling language (as process algebras also do, for example) but also a logic for reasoning about systems.
Reasoning about local temporal properties of distributed agents could also be performed in a linear temporal logic over
linearizations of the distributed models. However, this would come at the price of readability and simplicity. In contrast,
DTL is simple and robust in the sense that formulas are invariant with respect to different linearizations. We have taken
advantage of this in the proofs given in this paper.
With respect to formalizing and reasoning about security protocols and associated models, a large number of logics,
formalisms, and tools have been proposed in recent years, e.g. [3,5,10,12,22,30,62,63,38,42,46,48,52,55,59,60,64,65]. We
will not compare with those logics that have been proposed solely as an object logic for protocol verification, e.g. [13,15,21,
38,56,58]. Rather, we compare with formalisms and logics that can be used to establishmetatheoretic properties of protocol
models or even relate protocol models.
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The semantics of DTL is based on event structures. The most closely related formalism from the security community is
strand spaces [36,60,63], which is widely used to analyze properties and models of security protocols. In [17], we formally
investigated the relationship between the interpretation structures of our DTL network models and strand spaces. This
comparison yields, transitively, a comparison with the other approaches that have been related to strand spaces, e.g. [20,28,
29,37]. Our results show that DTL network models and strand-space models are compatible, although they offer different
views of protocol executions.We defined property-preserving, back-and-forth translations betweenmodels in our logic and
strand-space models. This is nontrivial as, despite the similarities between the two formalisms (for example, both are based
on partially ordered sets of events with labeling information), there are substantial differences. These differences concern
the way the principals and the intruder executing a protocol are represented, the way communication is formalized, and
the locality of information. While carrying out semantic reasoning directly in terms of our interpretation structures is not
that different than reasoning about bundles in the strand-space approach, a fundamental difference is that strand spaces do
not provide a logic. Hence, strand spaces lack a means for specifying classes of models axiomatically, a deductive system,
a property specification language, and the ability to relate models based on the properties they preserve, possibly under
formula translations.
The idea of using DTL to investigate general metatheoretic properties of security protocol models and model
simplification techniques was first explored in [16]. In this preliminary work, we used DTL to formalize and establish the
correctness of two model simplification techniques. We first proved that one intruder is enough, namely that it is sufficient
to consider one Dolev–Yao intruder instead of multiple intruders. Second, we proved the correctness of a predatory intruder,
which is an intruder with restricted behavior, e.g. who only sends messages that are immediately received and processed
by honest agents. Lemma 4.1 from the current paper generalizes not only a similar result from [16] but also the protocol-
independent secrecy results of [27,47], which capitalize on the notion of honest ideals on strand spaces introduced in [62].
The step compression technique that we considered in Section 5.2 is used in several other approaches, such as [3,10,52].
We have begun applying our logic to validate other techniques that can be used to improve the performance of analysis
tools for security protocols, such as the partial-order techniques developed for the OFMC model checker [9,53].
Numerous formal models have been proposed for reasoning about communication channels in security protocols and
services, e.g. [1,4,14,31,32,45,51], For example, [51] gives two different abstract models for channels that are authentic,
confidential, or secure: one that represents the ideal functionality of the channel and a second that employs concrete
cryptographic messages to realize the channel properties. These two models are then shown equivalent under suitable
assumptions. Our metareasoning results are in this spirit, in particular the proof of equivalence of the two models for
guaranteeing message-origin authentication. It will be interesting to see how far we can take our approach in this regard.
That is, whether and how our approach can be applied not only to obtain other such simulation-based results, but also to
reason about protocol compositionality as done, for instance, in [6,11,19] at the cryptographic level and in [51] as well as
in [1,2,14,25,31,32,35,56] at a symbolic, black-box cryptography level. The combination of results, techniques, and tools
from these and related approaches will play an important role in consolidating research in security protocol analysis.
We close with a final word on our use of DTL in this paper. Admittedly, given that our main example deals with the
linearization of the channel model, we do not require here the full power of the logic. Moreover, the security goals that we
have considered, secrecy and authentication, constitute safety properties, and therefore we have mostly used formulas with
simple past-time operators. Nevertheless, it should be clear that DTL can be used in many other, more complex, scenarios,
for example, tomodel the presence ofmultiple non-collaborating intruders (possibly with different capabilities) or different
channels with different properties (possibly controlled by different intruders). Furthermore, studying other interesting
security goals, like forms of fairness in contract-signing protocols, would also require working with liveness properties,
for which more complex temporal patterns would be necessary. Finally, note that we have avoided writing formulas with
nested communications. This does not mean that such formulas are not necessary, as they result easily from our axioms
(for instance, from the composition of axioms (P3), (C2), and (C1)). It is just a consequence of another nice property of DTL: in
specifying each agent, locally, in a distributed system, it is possible to replace any DTL formula with nested communications
with an equivalent finite set of formulas without nested communications [34]. The application of DTL to suchmore complex
scenarios, in the context of security protocols and web services, is the subject of future work.
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